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The War Powers Resolution: Conflicting
Constitutional Powers, the War Powers and
U.S. Foreign Policy*
BRADLEY LARSCHAN**
I. INTRODUCTION
Fourteen years, some practical experience and several Supreme Court
decisions have passed since the War Powers Resolution1 (WPR) was en-
acted over a Presidential veto on November 7, 1973.2 Since then, the
United States' foreign policy has grappled, with varying degrees of suc-
cess, with this unique legislation, which seeks to control the Executive's
use of armed force in situations short of war. The effectiveness of this
legislation has been problematic at best s and its future is clouded by lin-
gering questions as to its constitutionality and, on a policy level, by con-
cerns about the potential use of U.S. armed forces with respect to, among
other things, international terrorism.4
This paper will examine briefly the political and legislative history
of the War Powers Resolution. It will then set the War Powers Resolution
in historical perspective by analyzing the original intention of the Fram-
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1. Pub. L. 93-148, § 2, 87 Stat. 555, (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (1973)).
2. H.R.J. Res. 542, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REc. 24,707-708 (1973). President
Nixon vetoed the bill Oct. 24. Veto of War Powers Resolution, 9 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1285 (Oct. 29, 1973). The House overrode the veto (284-135), 119 CONG. REc. 36,202, 36,221
(1973), as did the Senate (75-18), 119 CONG. REC. 36,174, 36,198 (1973).
3. Turner, The War Powers Resolutions: Unconstitutional, Unnecessary and Un-
helpful, 17 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 683 (1984).
4. See, e.g., The testimony of the State Department's Legal Adviser of April 29, 1986,
before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, reprinted in BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, DEP'T STATE,
CURRENT POLICY No. 832, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION AND ANTITERRORIST OPERATIONS 1
(1986).
5. For a comprehensive account of the legislative history of the War Powers Resolution,
see H.R. Doc. No. 287, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2346.
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ers of the Constitution from a domestic and international legal perspec-
tive. This paper analyzes the fundamental constitutionality of sections
5(b)&(c) of the War Powers Resolution, as well as the Resolution's consti-
tutionality in light of the legislative veto cases. Finally, it will examine
the policy aspects of sections 5(b)&(c) of the War Powers Resolution, es-
pecially as they relate to the U.S. response to international terrorism.
A. Historical Development of the War Powers Resolution
The War Powers Resolution was born of Congressional frustration
over the United States' prolonged military involvement in Vietnam,6 the
second most divisive conflict in our history. The WPR was the culmina-
tion of Congressional efforts to curtail Presidential authority to commit
American troops into combat, beginning with the 1967 Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Hearings7 and Report.8 Under the stewardship of
Senator J. William Fulbright, a sense of the Senate Resolution was
adopted in June 1969 proclaiming that "a national commitment by the
United States results only from affirmative action taken by the executive
and legislative branches of the United States government by means of a
treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution of both Houses of Congress, spe-
cifically providing for such commitment."9
This country's involvement in Vietnam continued, however, as did
Congressional attempts to control (short of requiring complete with-
drawal), the President's discretion to commit U.S. forces in Southeast
Asia. 0 Following the announcement of the 1973 ceasefire agreement, the
Congress passed the Cooper-Church amendment 1" and the Mansfield
6. J. JAVITS, WHO MAKES WAR: THE PRESIDENT VERSUS THE CONGRESS 268-71 (1973).
7. U.S. Commitments to Foreign Powers: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on For-
eign Relations on S. Res. 151, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
8. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NATIONAL COMMITMENTS, S. REP. No. 797,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Many of the questions raised in the report questioning the
President's constitutional authority have been answered by the Executive branch. See, e.g.,
Sofaer, The Presidency, War, and Foreign Affairs: Practice Under the Framers, 40 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 12 (1976).
9. On the effects of a concurrent resolution, see Sofaer, id.
10. See A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS JR., THE WAR-MAKING POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT 119-
28 (1982).
11. The Cooper-Church amendment to the Department ( Defense Appropriations Act
of 1970, § 643, 83 Stat. 469, provides that "none of the funds appropriated by this Act shall
be used to finance the introduction of American combat troops into Laos or Thailand." The
Cooper-Church amendment to the Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, § 7, 84 Stat. 1942,
provides:
(a) In line with the expressed intention of the President of the United States,
none of the funds authorized or appropriated pursuant to this or any other Act
may be used to finance the introduction of United States ground combat
troops into Cambodia, or to provide United States advisers to or for
Cambodian military forces in Cambodia.
(b) Military and economic assistance provided by the United States to Cambo-
dia and authorized or appropriated pursuant to this or any other Act shall not
be construed as a commitment by the United States to Cambodia for its
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amendment.'2 These amendments forbade use of government funds for
American military activities in Indochina "unless specifically authorized"
by Congress. The Congress then approved a measure to cut off all funds
for U.S. combat activities in Cambodia and Laos. This measure, however,
was vetoed by President Nixon and an attempt to override the veto
failed."s President Nixon was compelled, for political reasons, to agree to
a "compromise" on July 1, 1973 in which funds for military activities in
Laos and Cambodia were cut off on August 15, 1973.1" The President
agreed thereafter to seek congressional authorization for further military
activities in Indochina. 5
During this period, a more subtle and yet infinitely more important
struggle was taking place. There was a clash of constitutional titans for
defense.
12. The Mansfield amendment to the Military Procurement Act of 1972, § 601(a), 85
Stat. 430, provides:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to terminate at the
earliest practicable date all military operations of the United States in Indo-
china, and to provide for the prompt and orderly withdrawal of all United
States military forces at a date certain, subject to the release of all American
prisoners of war held by the Government of North Vietnam and forces allied
with such Government and an accounting for all Americans missing in action
who have been held by or known to such Government or such forces. The Con-
gress hereby urges and requests the President to implement the above-ex-
pressed policy by initiating immediately the following actions:
(1) Establishing a final date for the withdrawal from Indochina of all mili-
tary forces of the United States contingent upon the release of all American
prisoners of war held by the Government of North Vietnam and forces allied
with such Government and an accounting for all Americans missing in action
who have been held by or known to such Government or such forces.
(2) Negotiate with the Government of North Vietnam for an immediate
cease-fire by all parties to the hostilities in Indochina.
(3) Negotiate with the Government of North Vietnam for an agreement
which would provide for a series of phased and rapid withdrawals of United
States military forces from Indochina in exchange for a corresponding series of
phased releases of American prisoners of war, and for the release of any re-
maining American prisoners of war concurrently with the withdrawal of all re-
maining military forces of the United States by not later than the date estab-
lished by the President pursuant to paragraph (1) hereof or by such earlier
date as may be agreed upon by the negotiating parties.
13. The Constitution provides for an override of a Presidential veto by a two-thirds
vote of the Congressmen present in each house, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, providing there
is a quorum. Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276 (1919). A quorum is a
majority of the members of each house. Id. See also Senate Rule 6, para. 1.
14. Act of July 1, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-50, § 307, 87 Stat. 99, 129 (1973). The Act
provided:
None of the funds herein appropriated under this Act may be expended to
support directly or indirectly combat activities in or over Cambodia, Laos,
North Vietnam and South Vietnam or off the shores of Cambodia, Laos, North
Vietnam and South Vietnam by the United States forces, and after August 15,
1973, no other such funds heretofore appropriated under any other Act may be
expended for such purposes.
15. See 87 Stat. 99.
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the control of U.S. foreign policy. The "Imperial Presidency" was under
siege by an assertive and powerful Congress. Since Franklin Roosevelt's
Presidency, the American Chief Executive's powers swelled on all things
touching foreign policy. The United States had emerged as the first Su-
perpower. Moreover, it was the only Western democracy in a position to
halt Soviet expansionism in what remained of war-torn Europe and other
areas of the globe. Of the two political branches of government, it was the
Presidency which was best equipped to meet the challenge of and to re-
spond quickly to political and military crises. Congress watched from the
sidelines as the Presidency grew increasingly independent of the legisla-
tive branch on matters of foreign policy.
Prior to Watergate, it was not the Congress but the Supreme Court
that had checked the growth of presidential power over foreign affairs.1"
The Congress became frustrated as Presidents committed this country to
a series of controversial policies, including the Berlin airlift, Korea,
NATO, the Bay of Pigs, the Congo rescue operation, intervention in the
Dominican Republic and the Cuban Missile Crisis. It was not until the
Nixon Presidency was confronted with the dual political crises of Water-
gate and Vietnam that the Congress was able to reassert itself. When it
did, it was with a vengeance. With an active and increasingly powerful
Congress confronting a President whose personal and political powers
were waning, the stage was set for the introduction of the War Powers
Resolution.17
B. Promulgation of the War Powers Resolution
Two provisions contain the heart of the War Powers Resolution,
which Professor Gerald Gunther characterized as "an unusual, quasi-con-
stitutional variety of congressional action, delineating not substantive
policy but processes and relationships." ' Section 5(b) requires the Presi-
dent to withdraw U.S. forces from hostilities or situations of imminent
hostilities within 60 or 90 days, unless Congress either declares war or
specifically authorizes continued military activities. Section 5(c) requires
the President to withdraw U.S. forces if directed by a concurrent resolu-
16. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) [hereinafter cited
as Steel Seizure Case]. It is interesting that this case has become the dumping ground of
constitutional reasoning, and is often invoked to support the thesis that war powers belong,
by negative implication, to the Congress. See, eg., Buchanan, In Defense Of The War Pow-
ers Resolution: Chadha Does Not Apply, 22 Hous. L. REV. 1155, 1162, n. 26 (1985). For a
discussion of the circumstances leading up to and including the Steel Seizure Case, see M.
MARcus, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER (1977);
A. WESTIN, THE ANATOMY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASE: YOUNGSTOWN SHEET AND TUBE
CO. V. SAWYER, THE STEEL SEIZURE DECISION (1958).
17. The War Powers Resolution was conceived and zealously promoted by Senator Ja-
cob K. Javits, who has written extensively on the subject. See, eg., J. JAVITS, WHO MAKES
WAR; THE PRESIDENT VERSUS CONGRESS, supra note 6.
18. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 371, n. 4 (11th ed. 1985).
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tion.' 9 It should be emphasized that the concurrent resolution was chosen
quite deliberately by the WPR's drafters as a device to avoid the consti-
tutionally-required two-thirds vote of each House to override a Presiden-
tial veto, so that a simple majority vote would replace the presentment
process."0
President Nixon rejected the War Powers Resolution. In his October
1973 veto message, he stated that it was "dangerous to the best interests
of our nation," and "that both these provisions [Sections 5(b)&(c)] are
unconstitutional. The only way in which the constitutional powers of a
branch of the Government can be altered is by amending the Constitu-
tion ... and any attempt to make such alterations by legislation alone is
clearly without force.
2 1
In the view of this writer, President Nixon was correct on both
grounds. The War Powers Resolution is bad public policy and it is uncon-
stitutional. It impairs the President's flexibility to project military power
as an instrument of American foreign policy. Moreover, it is unconstitu-
19. A concurrent resolution is to be distinguished from a joint resolution in that the
former is intended to become operative after it is approved by each house of Congress while
the latter is subject to Presidential disapproval and Congressional override. See generally
JEFFERSON'S MANUAL AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES §§ 396-97, H.R. Doc.
No. 403, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979).
20. See Spong, The War Powers Resolution Revisited: Historic Accomplishment or
Surrender? 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 823, 844-49 (1975). During the congressional debate on
the War Powers Resolution, Rep. Zablocki observed that, were it otherwise, "[o]ne-third of
either body will thwart the will of the majority." 119 CONG. REc. 24,689 (1973). See also
War Powers Resolution of 1973, H.R. REP. No. 287, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1973).
21. "Veto of War Powers Resolution," supra note 2.
Every Chief Executive since President Nixon has complied with the War Powers Reso-
lution but has explicitly stated that Sections 5(b) & (c) are without constitutional force. For
instance, in his signing statement enacting into law the Multinational Force in Lebanon
Resolution, Pub. L. 98-119, 97 Stat. 805, reprinted in 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1422
(Oct. 17, 1983). President Reagan said:
I believe it is, therefore, important for me to state in signing this resolu-
tion that I do not and cannot cede any of the authority vested in me under the
Constitution as President and as Commander-in-Chief of the United States
armed forces. Nor should my signing be viewed as any acknowledgement that
the President's constitutional authority can be impermissibly infringed by stat-
ute, that congressional authorization would be required if and when the period
specified in Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution might be deemed to
have been triggered and the period had expired or that Section 6 of the Mul-
tinational Force in Lebanon Resolution may be interpreted to revise the Presi-
dent's constitutional authority to deploy the United States armed forces.
Former President Gerald R. Ford noted in a 1977 lecture that "[t]he United States was
involved in six military crises during my presidency .... In none of those instances did I
believe the War Powers Resolution applied .... Furthermore, I did not concede that the
resolution itself was legally binding on the President on constitutional grounds." "The War
Powers Resolution: Striking a Balance between the Exectuive and Legislative Branches,"
speech by former President Gerald R. Ford, University of Kentucky, Louisville (Apr. 11,
1977), reprinted in A Review of the Operation and Effectiveness of the War Powers Resolu-
tion: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 325,
327 (1977) (statement of Pres. Gerald R. Ford).
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tional on two grounds: at least part of it is a legislative veto of the type
found unconstitutional in Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha 22 and Consumers Union, Inc. v. FTC.13 The WPR also violates
the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, depriving the Presi-
dent by means of mere statute (and against his will) of certain powers
vested in the Executive by the Constitution and reassigning those powers
to the Congress.24
II. MECHANICS OF THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
Congress' stated purpose in enacting the WPR was to:
fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution... and insure that
the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will
apply to the introduction of United States armed forces into hostili-
ties, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated by the circumstances and to the continued use of
such forces in hostilities or in such situations.
25
The WPR seeks to apply this "collective judgment" to three classes
of activities involving American armed forces2" (unless war has been de-
clared by the Congress). It is triggered where U.S. troops are introduced:
1. "into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;"
2. "into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while
equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to sup-
ply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces;" or
3. "in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed
Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation.""7
Under the War Powers Resolution, three discrete duties are imposed
upon the President:
1. He must consult the Congress prior to committing United States
armed forces "in every possible instance"."a
2. Once U.S. armed forces are deployed, he must submit a written
22. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
23. 691 F.2d 575 (D.D.C. 1982), affd mem. sub nor., Process Gas Consumer Group v.
Consumer Energy Council of America, Inc., 463 U.S. 1216 (1983), reh'g denied, 463 U.S.
1250 (1983).
24. Sec. 8(d) of the WPR expressly states that the War Powers Resolution does not
alter the constitutional authority of the President. This is not only a self-serving statement,
but also is an erroneous legal conclusion, for the reasons set forth below.
25. 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a) (1982).
26. Actually, the three types of activities are explicitly set forth in § 4(d), the "report-
ing requirement." Sec. 5(b) attempts to include these activities by reference, covering "any
use ... with respect to which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted)." Sec.
3 applies only to forces introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities.
27. 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a)(1)-(3) (1982).
28. 50 U.S.C. § 1542 (1982).
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report to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President
pro tempore of the Senate explaining (a) why the troops were committed;
(b) the President's legal authority to deploy the forces; and (c) the "esti-
mated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement." '29 If the U.S.
involvement continues, the President must report to the Congress period-
ically, but no less than every six months.
3. He must end the projection of American military power unless
the Congress takes positive action to authorize its continued use.
Section 5(b)30 requires affirmative congressional action to continue
the deployment or engagement of U.S. forces in an area of hostilities.31
Under Section 5(b), the President must withdraw U.S. armed forces
within 60 days unless both Houses of Congress agree, by concurrent reso-
lution, to continue American involvement. If either or both Houses of
Congress fail to authorize continued U.S. military involvement, through
action or inaction, the 60 day period may be extended automatically for
not more than an additional 30 days "if the President determines and
certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity
respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the contin-
ued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about" their
prompt removal.32
Section 5(c) provides that Congress may, by concurrent resolution,
require the President to remove U.S. armed forces at any time, notwith-
standing the 60 day provision in Section 5(b). The concurrent resolution
may be adopted by a simple majority of both Houses. Since it is not to be
presented to the President, a concurrent resolution is not subject to a
presidential veto.
Finally, the WPR contains a separability clause which provides that
if any provision is found to violate the Constitution, the remainder of the
WPR is to continue in effect. 8s
III. THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION'S UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
A. Section 5(c): Violates the Presentment Clause
Section 5(c), which has never been invoked by Congress, is clearly
unconstitutional. 4 Article I, § 7, cl. 2 of the Constitution requires that
29. 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a)(A)-(C) (1982).
30. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1982).
31. "Hostilities" are not defined in the WPR. However, one definition is found in the
Report of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on H.J. Res. 542, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,
quoted in Comment, A Tug of War: The War Powers Resolution and the Meaning of "Hos-
tilities," 15 PAc. L.J. 265, 282 (1982).
32. Id.
33. The constitutionality or effect, if any, of the severability clause is beyond the scope
of this paper. For a thought-provoking discussion, see Tribe, The Legislative Veto Decision:
A Law By Any Other Name, 21 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 21-27 (1984).
34. See infra text accompanying notes 35-51. See also Lungren & Krotoski, The War
Powers Resolution After The Chadha Decision, 17 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 767, 777 (1984), Tur-
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every bill passed by the Congress "shall, before it become a Law, be
presented to the President of the United States.""5 Since a concurrent
resolution is a unilateral congressional action, and not presented to the
President, it violates the presentment clause."6 Of course, the enactment
of the War Powers Resolution in itself met the requirements of the pre-
sentment clause. But the effect of Section 5(c) is to amend the present-
ment clause as it applies to future congressional acts. Put another way,
Section 5(c) is nothing less than a unilateral attempt to effect an ongoing
ner, The War Powers Resolution: Unconstitutional, Unnecessary, and Unhelpful, supra
note 3, at 684; Glennon, The War Powers Resolution Ten Years Later: More Politics Than
Law, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 571, 577 (1984).
35. A concurrent resolution, for purposes of constitutional analysis, would be consid-
ered a bill. But even if it weren't so considered, clause 3 provides:
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and
House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjourn-
ment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the
Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him,
shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives,
according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.
Clause 3 was inserted precisely to prevent a measure from being enacted by Congress
without Presentment to the President. See infra text accompanying notes 40-42. The pro-
cess of law-creation was intended to be cumbersome, with certain built-in time constraints,
to prevent Congress from encroaching upon the President's powers. See 2 THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 301 (M. Farrand ed. 1911). Presentment is also more than
a procedural nuisance, since the Framers wanted the Congress to be apprised of the Presi-
dent's reasons for a veto and then to reconsider their actions in this light. See infra text
accompanying notes 40-42.
36. The Supreme Court noted in Chadha that
[n]ot every action taken by either house is subject to the bicameralism and
presentment requirements of Art. I. Whether actions taken by either House
are, in law and fact, an exercise of legislative powers depends not on their form
but upon whether they contain matter which is properly to be regarded as leg-
islative in character and effect.
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952. Any action legislative in character must be performed by passage
in both houses and presentment to the President. E.E.O.C. v. Ingersoll Johnson Steel Co.,
583 F. Supp 883 (S.D. Ind. 1984).
In Chadha, the Court relied on an 1897 Senate committee report to determine what
action constitutes an exercise of legislative power and thereby necessitating that a bill be
presented to the President. 462 U.S. at 952. In the report, the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary had been directed by the Senate to, among other things, report whether concur-
rent resolutions must be submitted to the President. "The Constitution," the report notes,
"looks beyond the mere form of a resolution.., and looks rather to the subject matter." S.
Rep. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1897). Thus, it is the legislative substance of the
resolution, not necessarily the legal form, which is controlling. The report continued, "every
exercise of 'legislative powers' involves the concurrence of the two Houses; and every resolu-
tion not ... involving the exercise of legislative powers, need not be presented to the Presi-
dent." Id. at 8.
The Senate Committee found that, for an action to be an exercise of legislative power,
the measure must "contain matter" which would properly be "regarded as legislative in its
character and effect." Id. Chadha found that the immigration statute had a legislative ef-
fect because it altered the "legal rights, duties, and relations of persons, including [executive
branch officials and others], all outside the legislative branch." 462 U.S. at 952.
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restructuring of the Constitution by legislation. 7 It attempts to alter arti-
cle I, § 7, cl. 2 by granting to Congress the power for all time to decide, by
simple majority, without presentation to the Executive, that it may re-
quire a President to withdraw U.S. armed forces upon demand. 8 Thus, it
is unconstitutional on its face.
Equally important, Section 5(c) subverts the delicate balance of the
separation of powers.8 9 In this sense, the presentment clause is part of the
"checks and balances" and, as such, is a cornerstone of our constitutional
framework. The Supreme Court has noted "[t]he records of the Constitu-
tional Convention reveal that the requirement that all legislation be
presented to the President before becoming law was uniformly accepted
by the Framers."4 The Court went on to observe that:
Presentment to the President and the Presidential veto were consid-
ered so imperative that the draftsmen took special pains to assure
that these requirements could not be circumvented. During the final
debate on Art. I, § 7, cl. 2, James Madison expressed concern that it
might easily be evaded by the simple expedient of calling a proposed
law a "resolution" or "vote" rather than a "bill." As a consequence,
Art. I, § 7, cl. 3 . . . was added.41
Writing in The Federalist No. 73, Alexander Hamilton observed that
the President's veto power
establishes a salutary check upon the legislative body calculated to
guard the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of
any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to in-
fluence a majority of that body.... The primary inducement to con-
37. Although only recently addressed by the Supreme Court, the debate surrounding
the Presentment Clause has been with us for some time.
The issue was raised in connection with a proposed reservation to the Treaty
of Versailles authorizing American withdrawal from the League of Nations by
"concurrent resolution." Although the proposal was accepted by a majority of
the Senate, several Senators expressed the view that it was unconstitutional,
and President Wilson wrote in a letter to Senator Hitchcock, "I doubt whether
the President can be deprived of his veto power under the Constitution even
with his own consent." Clearly, neither a treaty nor an Act of Congress can
amend the Constitution, and an alteration of the procedure provided in the
Constitution for making any "order, resolution or vote" effective, would be
such an amendment.
Wright, The Power To Declare Neutrality Under American Law, 34 AM. J. INT'L L. 302,
307-08 (1940).
38. It might be argued that Congress has the power without § 5(c), based on its consti-
tutional mandate, to require the withdrawal of U.S. forces. But if this were true, why did
Congress believe it necessary to promulgate § 5(c) to begin with? Why not simply pass a
resolution mandating withdrawal? And why was it viewed as necessary to circumvent the
Presentment Clause? See supra note 7.
39. See infra notes and text accompanying notes 109-120.
40. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946, citing 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 611 (3d ed. 1858); 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787,
supra note 35, at 21, 73-74, 97-104, 138-140, 181, 301-305.
41. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946 (citations omitted).
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ferring the power in question upon the executive, is to enable him to
defend himself; the secondary one is to encrease the chances in favor
of the community, against the passing of bad laws, through haste, in-
advertence, or design.
42
During the constitutional debates, James Wilson stated that "[w]ithout
such a self-defence, the legislature can at any moment sink [the Execu-
tive] into non-existence. '48 It was in this sense that the presentment
clause question was central to the Supreme Court's landmark decision
finding the legislative veto unconstitutional. In Chadha, the Court said
that "[t]he decision to provide the President with a limited and qualified
power to nullify proposed legislation by veto was based on the profound
conviction of the Framers that the powers conferred on Congress were the
powers to be most carefully circumscribed.""
Of course, Chadha dealt specifically with the one House veto,"' while
Section 5(c) may be seen as a two House veto." But this ignores the fun-
42. The Federalist No. 73 (A. Hamilton), in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 372-73 (Bantam
Classic ed. 1982), quoted in Chadha, 462 U.S. at 947. Of the 85 Federalist Papers, which
first appeared on October 27, 1787, 26 discussed defense or foreign policy. Alexander Hamil-
ton wrote 51 papers, James Madison 29 and John Jay 5. For a fascinating and well-written
account of the events leading to the publication of The Federalist Papers, see R. MORRIS,
WITNESSES AT THE CREATION: HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY, AND THE CONSTITUTION (1985).
The Federalist Papers were written to persuade the people of New York State to ratify
the Constitution. One observer has noted that
[t]heir practical wisdom stands pre-eminent amid the stream of controversial
writing at the time. Their authors were concerned, not with abstract arguments
about political theory, but with the real dangers threatening America, the evi-
dent weakness of the existing Confederation, and the debatable advantages of
the various provisions of the new Constitution.
3 W. CHURCHILL, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES: THE AGE OF REVOLUTION
258 (1957).
43. 5 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 151 (J. Elliot ed. 1845) [hereinafter cited as DEBATES]. Accord id. at 347 (Ma-
son); id. at 344 (Ellsworth); id. at 345 (Madison).
44. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 947 (citations omitted). The Court went on to observe that
"[iut is beyond doubt that lawmaking was a power to be shared by both Houses and the
President." Id. (citations omitted).
The Founding Fathers assumed that the Congress would become the "first among
equals" in the federal government. For instance, based upon his experience, Madison be-
lieved there was "a tendency in our governments to throw all power into the Legislative
vortex." He observed that legislative encroachment "was the real source of danger to the
American constitutions," and suggested that this justified "the necessity of giving every de-
fensive authority to the other departments that was consistent with republican principles."
5 DEBATES, supra note 39, at 345. See also L. FISHER, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: POWER AND
POLICY 21-2 (1972).
45. Therefore, the issue of bicameralism was also presented in Chadha. However, the
issue in Chadha revolved around the legislative veto of a certain express delegation of con-
gressional authority to an administrative agency. See generally Ratner & Cole, The Force of
Law: Judicial Enforcement of the War Powers Resolution, 17 LoY. L.A.L. REv. 715, 738, n.
99 (1984).
46. Sec. 5(c) requires the President to withdraw troops if so directed by a concurrent
resolution of the Congress. This clearly is a two house veto. It is not clear, however, whether
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damental ground upon which Chadha was based: that there must be a
clear division in functions between branches, even though powers may be
shared. It was upon this basis that a two House veto was held unconstitu-
tional in Consumers Union, Inc. v. FTC.47 In a per curiam order affirmed
without opinion by the Supreme Court,'8 the District of Columbia ap-
peals court, en banc, held unconstitutional Section 21(a) of the Federal
Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, which provided that an
FTC regulation would become effective unless disapproved by concurrent
resolution of both Houses of Congress. The court found that Section 21(a)
violated both the separation of powers and "the procedures established
by Article I for the exercise of legislative powers." ' If anything, the War
Powers Resolution suffers from a greater constitutional infirmity because
it addresses not an independent administrative agency but the Presi-
dency. Section 5(c) is a legislative veto since it may act only in a unilat-
eral manner. It is a legislative action that overrides executive decision.
There can be no more clear a violation of the presentment clause and
the prohibition against the legislative veto than Section 5(c) of the War
Powers Resolution. From all outward appearances, it seems likely that
§ 5(b) is a one or two house veto. Sec. 5(b) requires the President to withdraw troops after
60 days, subject to a 30 day extension, unless Congress (1) has declared war, (2) passed a
concurrent resolution authorizing continued activities or (3) is physically unable to meet as
a result of armed attack upon the country. Thus, joint action is required by the Congress.
It should be noted, however, that § 5(b) also may be a one house veto. For instance if
the Senate approved Presidential action and the House rejected it, the President would be
required (under § 5(b)) to withdraw U.S. forces by virtue of the action (or inaction) of one
house of Congress. Lungren & Krotoski found that:
Section 5(b) has a significant effect because the action or inaction of one House
can terminate the use of armed forces abroad. While it is true that section 5(b)
does not contain express language providing for a one House legislative veto,
this is irrelevant since the operational force of the section is the functional
equivlent [sic] of a one House legislative veto.
Lungren & Krotoski, supra note 34, at 785-86.
47. Consumers Union, 691 F.2d 575.
48. United States House of Representatives v. Federal Trade Commission, 463 U.S.
1216 (1982).
49. Consumers Union, 691 F.2d at 578.
50. Sec. 5(c) may be unconstitutional on another ground, depending upon the factual
context, because it may conflict with the President's powers as Commander in Chief. See A
Review of the Operation and Effectiveness of the War Powers Resolution: Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, supra note 21, at 72, 74-5 (statement of former
State Dep't Legal Adviser Monroe Leigh). This is especially true in the area of self-defense,
which is a constitutional function of the President. But see § 2(c) of the WPR, which nar-
rowly defines the President's powers as Commander in Chief. This led one observer to note
that
[tihe legislative veto provisions of section 5(c) would allow Congress unilater-
ally to determine whether or not to permit the use of the armed forces in cases
of self-defense, for example. A power which lies in the domain of the Executive
under the Constitution would thus be transferred to the control of Congress.
No resolution of Congress is constitutionally capable of accomplishing this
feat.
Statement of Monroe Leigh, id., at 76.
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the current Supreme Court"1 would strike down Section 5(c) as long as
Chadha stands52 (if the challenge surmounts the issue of justiciability).
B. Section 5(b): Fundamental Constitutional Issues
1. Violates The Separation Of Powers
A more detailed analysis is required to demonstrate that Section 5(b)
violates the doctrine of the separation of powers and institutions.5 3
Section 5(b) requires the President to withdraw U.S. armed forces
engaged in hostilities or imminent hostilities within 60 days, subject to a
30 day extension, unless war has been declared or both Houses of Con-
gress specifically authorize an extension. Thus, both Houses of Congress
must take affirmative action, by a simple majority vote on a concurrent
resolution, to authorize the continued deployment of U.S. armed forces.
Or, to put it the other way, the President is required to withdraw Ameri-
can forces if Congress fails to act." Moreover, either House may block the
use of American troops by a simple majority vote or by failing to address
the issue.55
In Chadha, the Court found the legislative veto unconstitutional be-
cause it has "the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties,
and relations of persons, including [Executive branch officials], all outside
The delegation of the Commander in Chief power is quite narrow. See infra text accom-
panying notes 139-49.
51. There is an aversion by the courts to reach the merits of war powers disputes. See
Henkin, Constitutional Issues in Foreign Policy, 23 J. INr'L AFF. 222 (1969).
52. Apparently, Justice White reached the same conclusion. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 970-71
(White, J., dissenting).
53. But see Lungren & Krotoski, supra note 34, at 782-83 (arguing that Chadha has
rendered § 5(b) unconstitutional per se). For a well-reasoned and precisely contrary view,
see Buchanan, supra note 16 (arguing that the War Powers Resolution is unaffected by
Chadha).
54. Unless Congress is physically unable to meet, in which case the President may con-
tinue to act. See § -, WPR, supra note 1.
55. Arthur Schlesinger asks: "If one house of Congress could prevent the declaration or
authorization of war, why should not a single house be able to prevent the continuation of
undeclared or unauthorized war?" A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 306 (1973).
This presupposes, of course, that the President did not have the original authority to com-
mit U.S. armed forces to combat - a thesis with which I disagree as a matter of constitu-
tional delegation of powers, and to which two centuries of practice stands in opposition.
Moreover, the termination of hostilities is distinctly different, from a constitutional law per-
spective, from a declaration of war. Cf. 2 J. STORY, supra note 40, at § 1171 ("It should
therefore be difficult in a republic to declare war, but not to make peace."). See also note 72,
infra.
It is widely accepted that the President, as Commander in Chief, has the power to
negotiate and enter into armistice agreements without Congress' consent. See L. HENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 52 (1975). Similarly, the President has the constitu-
tional authority to make executive agreements, while treaties require consent of the Senate.
See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). Finally, the constitution is quite
precise as to the law-making process, a fact Prof. Schlesinger's reasoning overlooks.
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the legislative branch."" The legislative effect of Section 5(b) is to termi-
nate the Executive's use of armed force in the absence of express ap-
proval by both Houses within a short time frame. This can be done
through Congressional inaction or by the "veto" of one House.
The only way to interpret Section 5(b) consistently with the prohibi-
tion against the legislative veto, is to assume that the decision to use
American troops is assigned solely to the Congress by the Constitution.
5 7
As Fredrick S. Tipson, former chief counsel of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, put it, under Section 5(b) "the president's authority to
act in emergencies simply runs out in 60 days if Congress does nothing.""
Under this view, the Constitution vests the Congress with the requisite
war powers; the Congress has delegated to the President discretionary
powers for only 60 days without further Congressional approval. This as-
sessment of the war powers is premised upon the assumption that consti-
tutional separation of powers and institutions accords the Congress,
rather than the Executive, most of the War Powers. This paper will argue
that the constitutional separation of powers and institutions is that once
Congress has raised an army, appropriated funds for its support, ap-
proved pay scales and appointments, and promulgated rules for military
conduct, it then falls to the President to use the armed forces in his ca-
pacity to conduct foreign policy in situations short of war. Because the
War Powers Resolution is based upon a constitutional interpretation
under which the Congress exercises certain Executive War Powers, it is a
usurpation by the Congress of the President's power and, thus, a violation
of the constitutional separation of powers.
2. The Powers Shared
In domestic affairs, the Constitution's sharing of power and responsi-
bility are fairly clear. "In foreign affairs, it was often cryptic, ambiguous
and incomplete."" Like other principal functions of national government,
the War Power" is a "pattern of shared constitutional authority.., not
56. 462 U.S. at 952. The Court went on to state that "[t]he one-House veto operated in
these cases to overrule the Attorney General and mandate Chadha's deportation; absent the
House action, Chadha would remain in the United States. Congress has acted and its action
has altered Chadha's status." Id. The same may be said of the effect of one house voting
against continued use of force, or inaction by either or both houses, under § 5(b).
57. See, e.g., the comment of Rep. Clement Zablocki that "under the Constitution, Con-
gress is given the exclusive power to commit troops into hostilities. Congress does not dele-
gate this power to the President in the War Powers Resolution." Zablocki, War Powers
Resolution: Its Past Record and Future Promise, 17 Lov. L.A.L. REv. 579, 590 (1984).
58. Tipson, The War Powers Resolution Is Constitutional and Enforceable, A.B.A. J.,
March 1984, at 10, 14.
59. A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 55, at 2.
60. War has been defined as an international legal "state of armed hostility between
sovereign nations or governments." 7 J.B. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 154 (1906).
The War Power of the federal government is more difficult to define. "This power is tremen-
dous," said John Quincy Adams; "it is strictly constitutional; but it breaks down every bar-
rier so anxiously erected for the protection of liberty, property and of life." Quoted in
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an hermetic separation of powers, but a scheme of divided power - what
Hamilton called an intermixture of powers, the only effective way to pre-
vent a monopoly of power in any one branch of government."'
It is axiomatic that the Constitution divides the War Powers between
the Executive and the Congress.6 2 The Constitution does not address ex-
plicitly the issue of which branch of government has the power to decide
to deploy U.S. armed forces in situations of hostilities or imminent hostil-
ities. The Congress' War Powers are specifically enumerated in the Con-
stitution. With respect to the use of force, Congress has the power to de-
clare war,"3 to raise and support Armies," to provide and maintain a
Navy,"5 to make laws regulating the armed forces,66 and to support the
militia of the several states.67
The President's powers, by comparison, are described vaguely but are
hardly less important. The "executive power" is vested in the President."
He is the Commander in Chief of U.S. armed forces,6 9 as well as of the
militia when called into federal service. 70 He also has the power to call
forth the militia in certain circumstances. 7' The President has "declared
United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 622 (1931).
The war power of the national government is "the power to wage war success-
fully." It extends to every matter and activity so related to war as substantially
to affect its conduct and progress. The power is not restricted to the winning of
victories in the field and the repulse of enemy forces. It embraces every phase
of the national defense, including the protection of war materials and the
members of the armed forces from injury and from the dangers which attend
the rise, prosecution and progress of the war.
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943).
[Tihe war power of the Federal Government is not created by the emergency
of war, but it is a power given to meet that emergency. It is a power to wage
war successfully, and thus it permits the harnessing of the entire energies of
the people in a supreme cooperative effort to preserve the nation. But even the
war power does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential
liberties.
Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934).
When used in this article, the War Power will refer to so much of that sweeping consti-
tutional grant of power as is implicated by the War Powers Resolution, i.e., the power to
send U.S. armed forces into combat abroad.
61. Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50 TEX. L. REV. 833,
847 (1972). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976).
62. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. at 93 ("The Constitution commits to the
Executive and the Congress the exercise of the war power").
63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
64. Id. at cl. 12.
65. Id. at cl. 13.
66. Id. at cl. 14.
67. Id. at cls. 15 & 16.
68. Id. at art. II, § 1, cl. 1. See infra note 134.
69. Id at § II, cl. 1. See infra notes and text accompanying notes 135, 139-49.
70. Id.
71. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 28-33 (1827); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7
How.) 1, 44-48 (1849); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1862); Sterling v. Con-
stantin, 287 U.S. 378, 399 (1932). Compare U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
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peace''72 and proclaimed neutrality.78 And, very early in our history, John
Marshall observed that "[tihe President is the sole organ of the nation in
its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations."
7 4
Indeed, the President may obligate the United States to other States
72. This is a non-exclusive power which has been exercised unilaterally by the execu-
tive. The Supreme Court observed that" '[t]he state of war' may be terminated by treaty or
legislation or Presidential proclamation." Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 168 (1948). See
also Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U.S. 146, 161 (1919); McElrath v. United
States, 102 U.S. 426, 438 (1880); The Protector, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 700 (1871); United States
v. Anderson, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 56, 70 (1869).
73. In 1793, when revolutionary France declared war on England, President Washing-
ton proclaimed U.S. "impartiality." (The international law term "neutrality" was avoided,
Letter of Jefferson to Monroe, July 14, 1793, in 7 J.B. MOORE, supra note 60, at 1004, just as
the international law term "blockade" was avoided in President Kennedy's "quarantine" of
Cuba during the missile crisis. Address of Oct. 22, 1962 of Pres. Kennedy, 47 Dep't State
Bull. 715 (Nov. 12, 1962); Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F.
Kennedy, 1962 806 (1963).) Several pro-French members of Congress vehemently de-
nounced the action as infringing Congressional power. However, President Washington -
outraged by the conduct of the French minister, the notorious Citizen Genet, who sought to
entangle the fledgling nation in the European war and, among other things, issued letters of
marque and reprisal from his American legation to U.S. merchantmen and established Prize
courts in French consulates, B. ZIEGLER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF JOHN MARSHALL 183
(1939) - believed the power was at least in part vested in the President. See H. LODGE,
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 172-74 (1882). This dispute sparked the well-known Pacificus-
Helvidius letters initiated by Alexander Hamilton and acrimoniously replied to by James
Madison. See generally Letters of Pacificus and Helvidius on the Proclamation of Neutral-
ity of 1793 (1845, reprinted in 1976). Similarly, following the outbreak of the First World
War in August 1914, Pres. Wilson issued a proclamation of neutrality.
It should be noted, however, that in 1794, Congress passed the first Neutrality Act, 1
Stat. 381 (1794), and in 1917 passed another Neutrality Act, 40(1) Stat. 217 (1917).
74. The statement was made in the House of Representatives when Marshall was a
Congressman debating the Jonathan Robbins affair. 10 Annals of Cong. 613 (1800), re-
printed in 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.), App. 1, at 26 (1820). This phrase has been invoked repeatedly
by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406
U.S. 759, 766-68 (1972); Chicago & Southern Airlines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333
U.S. 103, 109 (1948)(paraphrased); Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 208 (1948)(per
curiam) (Douglas, J., concurring); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942); Ludecke
v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 173 (1948) (paraphrased) (Black, J. dissenting); United States v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330; United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-
20 (1936); Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 707 (D.C. Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds,
444 U.S. 996 (1979). See also REP. OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Feb. 15,
1816, Compilation of Reports, 1901, 56th Cong., 2d Sess., Sen. Doc. 231, Vol. 8, p. 24 ("The
President is the constitutional representative of the United States with regard to foreign
nations."), quoted in Curtiss-Wright, supra, at 319. See generally Henkin, The President
and International Law, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 930, 932-33 (1986).
Hamilton characterized this power as "the constitutional agency of the president[] in
the conduct of foreign negotiations." The Federalist No. 75 (A. Hamilton), supra note 42, at
381. But see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 164-65 (1978); L. HENKIN, supra note
55, at 45-50, criticizing this characterization of the President's powers as too sweeping and
without constitutional foundation. Cf. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661, et seq.
(1981); Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's
Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946); Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corpora-
tion: An Historical Assessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1 (1977); Berger, The Presidential Monopoly
of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1, 26-33 (1972).
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through executive agreement, including certain military agreements, with-
out the advice and consent of the Senate.75
75. Under the Constitution, of course, the Senate must advise and consent to a treaty
before the President may ratify it. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. The Supreme Court has held that
a treaty must involve an issue "properly the subject of negotiations with a foreign country."
Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890). See also Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25. How-
ever, all international compacts are not treaties which require the "participation" of the
Senate. U.S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330-31. See also U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. at 230. The
parameters of the Executive's power to make international agreements is unresolved. L.
TRIBE, supra note 74, at 170. See also State Dep't Circular No. 175, Dec. 13, 1955, reprinted
in 50 AM. J. INTL. L. 784 (1956); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 119, Comment (1965). Dr. Guive Mirfendereski commented that the
President's constitutional power to enter into sole executive agreements is narrow.
The language in Belmont may lead some to conclude that there is a class of
agreements that the President can ratify independent of the "advice and con-
sent" of the Senate. Such a conclusion is untenable. The Belmont decision
speaks of agreements whose ratification does not always require the participa-
tion of the Senate. In other words, not every agreement requires the active or
affirmative exercise of the Senate's power of "advice and consent." The Sen-
ate's "advice and consent" - i.e., approval - may take other forms: silence,
implied approval, acquiescence. In fact, the presumption of congressional ap-
proval is upset only where the Congress does in some way resist the exercise of
Presidential authority. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686-88
(1981). Therefore, in Dames & Moore, the Supreme Court found Congress' im-
plicit approval to be "crucial" to its decision to uphold the President's power
to bind the U.S. to a series of agreements with Iran for the release of U.S.
citizens. 453 U.S. at 680. Furthermore, the Court went as far as to suggest that
the ratification of agreements without the explicit advice and consent of the
Congress is only so because of the Congress' decision not to require it. The
Court took judicial notice of the fact that the Congress is quite capable of
objecting to executive agreements, as it did with respect to a 1977 Executive
Agreement with Czechoslovakia, forcing the Executive to renegotiate the
claims settlement agreement. Id. at 688, n. 13.
Letter from Dr. Guive Mirfendereski to the author (Jan. 31, 1987) (discussing the issue of
Presidential powers under the Constitution to engage in sole executive agreements). See
further Mathews, The Constitutional Power of the President to Conclude International
Agreements, 64 YALE L.J. 345 (1955); Wright, The United States and International Agree-
ments, 38 AM. J. INT'L L. 341 (1944). See the interesting discussion of the tension in the use
of executive agreements as a method of the President's conduct of foreign policy, in Rehm,
Making Foreign Policy Through International Agreement, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY 126-38 (F. Wilcox & R. Frank eds. 1976). See generally United
States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655, 660 (4th Cir. 1953), affd on other grounds 348
U.S. 296 (1955) ("The executive may not by-pass congressional limitations regulating ...
[imports] by entering into an agreement with [a] foreign country that the regulation be
exercised by the country through its control over exports"); United States v. Schooner
Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 64, 109-10 (1801).
One of the most important executive agreements was the "Destroyers for Bases" ar-
rangement of Sept. 9, 1940, between the United States and Great Britain, prior to the U.S.
entry into the Second World War. E.A.S. No. 181 (1940). See 39 Op. Atty. Gen. 484 (Aug.
27, 1940). The U.S. traded 50 destroyers for 99-year leases on military bases in eight British
possessions from Newfoundland to the Carribbean. In his memoirs on the war, Winston
Churchill characterized the arrangement as "a decidedly unneutral act by the United States.
It would, according to all the standards of history, have justified the German Government in
declaring war upon them." 2 W. CHURCHILL, THE SECOND WORLD WAR: THEIR FINEST HOUR
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It is clear that the Congress may prohibit the use of U.S. armed
forces in certain areas by statute. It is also clear that it is the President
who orders deployment of troops. Nowhere, however, does the Constitu-
tion specifically set forth which branch of government has the power to
decide to deploy American forces in situations of hostilities or imminent
hostilities. We must, therefore, indulge in constitutional interpretation.
There are two principal methods of inquiry: first, to analyze the intent of
the Founding Fathers; second, to examine the theoretical structure of the
government-the separation of powers and institutions-to determine
where the power reposes.
3. Original Intent
Any attempt to discern the original intent7 ' of the Founding Fathers
as a method of constitutional interpretation is, at best, a dubious affair.
As John P. Roche observed:
The prodigious outpouring of "authoritative" interpretations of the
"original intent" of the Framers of the Constitution ... is rather baf-
fling to one who has spent almost 40 years laboring in the primary
sources of 18th-century American constitutionalism ...
What finally emerged was not a separation of powers but a sepa-
ration of institutions: the President's veto is a legislative power of im-
mense impact, as is the authority of the Federal judiciary to hold acts
of Congress unconstitutional . . .. The Senate clearly moves in on ex-
ecutive power when it approves appointments, and if Hamilton's ob-
servations in Federalist 77 that "the consent of that body would be
necessary to displace as well as to appoint" had ever been ranked as
an "original intent," the President would really be locked in.
[Affter four decades I can sadly testify that not only do I not
know the "original intent" of the Framers - a fantastic reification on
its face - but I increasingly suspect that much of the time on many
of the provisions they didn't either. I know what Madison thought of
some things, what Hamilton thought about others, but have no to rea-
son to believe their views were the accepted wisdom.77
404 (1949).
The effect of the destroyers-for-bases arrangement may have been to move the U.S.
from "neutrality" to the uncertain international legal status of "non-belligerency." In ap-
pealing to President Roosevelt for weapons in May 1940, Prime Minister Churchill urged
the United States to "proclaim non-belligerency, which would mean that you would help us
with everything short of actually engaging armed forces." Id. at 24-25. On the question of
non-belligerency, see, e.g., Wilson, Some Current Questions Relating to Neutrality, 37 AM.
J. INT'L L. 651 (1943); Kunz, Neutrality and the European War 1939-1940, 39 MICH. L.
REV. 719 (1940-1941). Cf. note 80, infra.
76. Reference to original intent is instructive on the broad structure of the government.
On issues of detail, however, original intent is as often misleading as it is informative.
77. Roche, "A Constitution Short on Intent," N.Y. Times, May 18, 1986, at 24, col. 4.
Compare, for example, Hamilton's view of the constitutional authority to direct the use
of force, 4 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 437-44 (H. Lodge ed. 1904), with Madison's
view. 6 THE WRINGS OP JAMES MADISON 138-88 (G. Hunt ed. 1906).
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The futility of discerning original intent is exemplified by the debate
over the substitution of the phrase "declare War" for "make War" during
the drafting of Article I.7 The debate usually starts like this: under the
Articles of Confederation, Congress had the power to declare and make
war.7 9 The original draft of the Constitution gave Congress the power to
"make war," which was changed during the Constitutional Convention to
"declare war." This is significant because "one of the chief purposes of
the Convention was to separate the legislative from the executive func-
tions."80 The inference is that the power to declare war - that is, to mo-
bilize the country and to alter the United States' international legal sta-
tus (with its many ramifications), in itself a constitutional law issue -
was of a clearly legislative character and, thus, belonged to the Congress.
The power to "make war," however, was considered an executive function
and, thus, belonged to the President.81
Another view is that the Founding Fathers themselves intended a
more narrow meaning. Of late, the most often quoted" treatment of the
debate on the War Power during the Constitutional Convention is by
Judge Abraham Sofaer, now Legal Adviser to the Department of State,
who observed:
78. Changes in language between the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution
may be significant. In McCulloch v. Maryland, for example, Chief Justice Marshall noted
that the word "expressly" does not appear in the Tenth Amendment, although it was con-
tained in the Articles of Confederation. "The men who drew and adopted this amendment
had experienced the embarrassments resulting from the insertion of this word in the Arti-
cles of Confederation, and probably omitted it, to avoid those embarrassments." 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 406-07 (1819). See also Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 85 (1900) (recognizing
the "distinction between the Articles of Confederation and the present constitution" for
purposes of discerning the meaning of words within the Constitution).
79. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. 9.
80. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 115-16 (1926) (Taft, C.J.). The Court did not
alter its reasoning on the separation of powers as it relates to this argument in Humphrey's
Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), and Weiner v. United States, 357 U.S. 349
(1958).
81. The traditional view is that the change from "make" to "declare" war was intended
to give the President significantly greater powers. See, e.g., Emerson, The War Powers Res-
olution Tested: The President's Independent Defense Power, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 187,
209 (1975). See also Lungren & Krotoski, supra note 34, at 769-772. But see Lofgren, War-
Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 YAE L.J. 672 (1972).
Professor Lofgren considers the change from "make" to "declare" as an ambiguous one, and
sets forth five explanations of its significance. First, America would therefore restrict itself
to fully declared wars. Second, America would limit its intercourse with other nations to
trade and commerce. Third, if Congress' power to declare war is strictly interpreted then the
power to make undeclared wars must be viewed as not belonging to Congress but to the
President. Fourth, as used in the Constitution, "declare" was taken to mean "commence"
and not the narrower international law term of art. Finally, any war-commencing power not
covered by Congress' power to declare war must be considered as vested in Congress because
of Congress' control of reprisals, e.g., the power to grant letters of marque and reprisal. Id.
at 694-95.
82. See, e.g., A. Lakeland, The War Powers Resolution: Necessary and Legal Remedy
to Prevent Future Vietnams, in CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND FOREIGN POLICY 153, 153-54
(S. Soper ed. 1984).
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The draft Constitution assigned Congress the power to "make" war.
Charles Pinckney sought on August 17 to vest the power in the Senate
alone; the Senate would be familiar with foreign affairs, it already had
the power to make treaties of peace, and action by both houses would
take too long. Pierce Butler responded that, if informed judgment and
efficiency were the relevant criteria, he was "for vesting the power in
the President, who will have all the requisite qualities, and will not
make war but when the Nation will support it." Madison then "moved
to insert 'declare,' striking out 'make' war; leaving to the Executive
the power to repel sudden attacks." Sherman apparently assumed the
President already had power to repel attacks. He thought the clause
"stood very well. The Executive shd. be able to repel and not to com-
mence war. 'Make' better than 'declare' the latter narrowing the
power too much."
Elbridge Gerry from Massachusetts, who seconded Madison's mo-
tion to substitute "declare" for "make," attacked Butler's suggestion:
he "never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower the
Executive alone to declare war." Ellsworth then spoke against Pinck-
ney's motion to give the power of war to the Senate. "[Tihere is a
material difference," he said, "between the cases of making war, and
making peace. It shd. be more easy to get out of war, then into it. War
also is a simple and overt declaration. Peace attended with intricate &
secret negotiations." George Mason of Virginia also was for clogging
war and facilitating peace, and therefore "was agst giving the power of
war to the Executive, because not (safely) to be trusted with it; or to
the Senate, because not so constructed as to be entitled to it." He
added that "he preferred 'declare' to 'make," and Rufus King con-
curred because "'make' war might be understood to 'conduct' it which
was an Executive function."
Pinckney's suggestion that the Senate be given the power to make
war was rejected overwhelmingly, but Madison's motion to change
"make" for "declare" was approved. The change was intended by
Madison and Gerry to enable the President to respond to "sudden
attacks" without a declaration of war, and by King and others to leave
the conduct of war in executive hands. They therefore appear to have
intended the clause to authorize the President to defend the United
States from attack without consulting the legislature, at least where
the attack is so "sudden" that consultation might jeopardize the na-
tion. But nothing in the change signifies an intent to allow the Presi-
dent a general authority to "make" war in the absence of a declara-
tion; indeed, granting the exceptional power suggests that the general
power over war was left in the legislative branch. 83
Judge Sofaer suggests that the Founding Fathers intended by "make
war" only to give the President power enough to repel sudden attacks,
but that Congress retained the power to decide when and where force was
to be used.
83. A. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE ORIGINS 31-32
(1976) (citations omitted).
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Now that is a powerful argument to draw an opposite inference. But
this conclusion is historically incorrect and raises more questions than it
answers. For one thing, it does not consider what the Founding Fathers
meant by "war." There is a strong argument that the Founding Fathers
had in mind something more akin to the international law" distinction"8
between "war" and "peace"" than to the practice of using force without
declaring war,8 7 such as the French intervention in the American war of
84. "International law had unobtrusively been woven into the fabric of our national
existence." Raymond & Frischholz, Lawyers Who Established International Law in the
United States, 1776-1914, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 802, 803 (1982).
85. "War is an aspect of a nation's international relations and must therefore be seen
from the perspective of the international as well as the domestic order." Wallace, The War-
Making Powers: A Constitutional Flaw?, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 719, 720 (1972). This has been
a recognized and well-settled proposition at least since Penhallow v. Doane, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
54, 83-84 (1795). See also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 315, et
seq.
86. As Grotius observed, "inter bellum et pacem nihil est medium" (between war and
peace there is no other category). H. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis III, xxi, 1 (1625). Mod-
ern international law also recognizes this distinction. See, eg., L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
LAW, Vol. 1, PEACE (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955), Vol. 2, War (H. Lauterpacht 7th ed.
1952) [hereinafter cited as Lauterpacht].
87. Among other things, the declaration of war alters the declarant's international legal
status, empowering the declarant to take action, i.a., against certain shipping, and forcing
other States to declare war or neutrality - a fact the Federalists, mostly from northern
trading states, were keenly aware of. Indeed, it was in Massachusetts that the first American
Prize court was established. 1 J.B. SCOTT, PRIZE CASES DECIDED IN THE UNITED STATES SU-
PREME CoURT 1789-1918 2 (1923). In the 1807 British Prize case The Neptune, Sir William
Scott (Lord Stowell) observed that "[ilt is well known that a declaration of hostility natu-
rally carries with it an interdiction of all commercial intercourse; it leaves the belligerent
countries in a state that is inconsistent with the relations of commerce." 165 Eng. Rep. 978,
979, 6 Rob. 403, 405-06 (1807). See also Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 532, 535-36
(1867) (it is universally accepted that "the immediate and necessary consequence of a decla-
ration of war is to interdict all intercourse or dealings between the subjects of the belliger-
ent states."); The William Bagaley, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 377, 405 (1866) ("War necessarily in-
terferes with the pursuits of commerce and navigation, as the belligerent parties have a
right, under the law of nations, to make prize of the ships, goods, and effects of each other
upon the high seas."); Jecker v. Montgomery, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 110, 112 (1855) ("The con-
sequence of this state of hostility is, that all intercourse and communication between [bel-
ligerents] is unlawful."; The Commercen, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 382, 395-407 (1816) (Marshall,
C.J. concurring) (declared war between the U.S. and Britain gave the U.S. the "declared
right" under international law to capture a Prize Swedish vessel where Sweden was a co-
belligerent with Britain against France, a war in which the U.S. was neutral); The Nereide,
13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 418 (1815) ("[Wlar gives a full right to capture the goods of an
enemy, but gives no right to capture the goods of a friend."); The Rapid, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch)
155 (1814) (A state of war provides states with the right to authorize capture of enemy
vessels); The Julia, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 181, 193 (1814) ("[I]n war, all intercourse between
the subjects and citizens of the belligerent countries is illegal"); The Sally, 12 U.S. (8
Cranch) 382 (1814) (Property of enemy nationals as well as citizens of U.S. trading with the
enemy, captured on the high seas, is prize of war under international law); Hannay v. Eve, 7
U.S. (3 Cranch) 242, 247 (1806) (during a declared war, international law authorizes the U.S.
government to allow the crew of an enemy vessel to submit their ship and collect the Prize).
See generally The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); 10 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 791-913 (1968); 7 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-341; A.
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independence, or limiting the Executive from using armed force short of
war in pursuit of the then-recognized international law rights of self-help
or reprisal."8 It was perhaps in this sense that Oliver Ellsworth observed
during the constitutional debate that "[wiar . . . is a simple and overt
declaration."89 Similarly, when Elbridge Gerry said he "never expected to
hear in a republic a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare
war," he contemplated a declaration, not the tactical use of force."' It
VERZIJL, LE DROIT DES PRISES DE LA GRANDE GUERRE (1924); 7 J.B. MOORE, supra note 60, at
342-858.
A preliminary exercise to the taking of Prize is the right of visit and search. The Ner-
eide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 427-28; G. HACKWORTH, supra, at 175-76. The Supreme Court
noted that "[tihe right of visitation and search [is] strictly a belligerent right." The Ante-
lope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 119 (1825) (Marshall, C.J.). "[T]he right of visitation and
search ... is strictly a belligerent right, allowed by the general consent of nations, in time of
war, and limited to those occasions." The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 42 (1826)
(Story, J.). In The Louis, 2 Dods. 210, 165 E.R. 1464 (1817), the High Court of Admiralty
observed that
[t]his right; incommodious as its exercise may occasionally be to those who are
subjected to it, has been fully established in the legal practice of nations, hav-
ing for its foundation the necessities of self-defense, in preventing the enemy
from being supplied with the instruments of war, and from having its means of
annoyance augmented by the advantages of maritime commerce.
2 Dods. at 238, Id. at 1475. Accord The Young Jacob and Johanna, 1 Rob. 20, 165 E.R. 81
(1798); The Maria, 1 Rob. 340, 165 E.R. 199 (1799).
Because of this, the War Power was linked to the Commerce Power, which is specifically
assigned to the Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. One highly respected scholar has
observed that "[n]eutral merchants had very profitable possibilities connected with the car-
rying trade of belligerents, while merchants operating as privateers, or others exercising bel-
ligerent rights had quite different opportunities which called for a careful readjustment of
mercantile rights." A.P. Rubin, Foreign Policy by Congress: Book Review, 4 FLETCHER FOR.
283, 284 (1980). See also L. ATHERLEY-JONES, COMMERCE IN WAR (1907); F. UPTON, THE LAW
OF NATIONS AFFECTING COMMERCE DURING WAR 16-36, et seq. (3d ed. 1863). It was, perhaps,
in this vein that President Washington urged in his Farewell Address that "[tihe great rule
of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations to
have with them as little political connection as possible." G. Washington, Farewell Address,
reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 70, 77 (R. Morris ed. 1965). The
linkage of "war, peace and commerce" is also made in The Federalist No. 64 (J. Jay), supra
note 42, at 325.
88. See, e.g., A. HINDMARSH, FORCE IN PEACE: FORCE SHORT OF WAR IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 85, passim (1933, reprinted in 1973). The eminent international law scholar
Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht observed that self-help and reprisal "are not necessarily acts
initiating war." 2 Lauterpacht, supra note 86, at 203.
89. Quoted in A. SOFAER, supra note 83.
90. John Bassett Moore noted that:
Much confusion may be avoided by bearing in mind the fact that by the term
war is meant not the mere employment of force, but the existence of the legal
condition of things in which rights may be prosecuted by force. Thus, if two
nations declare war one against the other, war exists, though not force
whatever may as yet have been employed. On the other hand, force may be
employed by one nation against another ... and yet no state of war may arise.
... The distinction is of the first importance, since, from the moment when a
state of war supervenes third parties become subject to the performance of the
duties of neutrality as well as to all the inconveniences that result from the
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should be recalled that it was Gerry who, in June 1775, proposed the es-
tablishment of the first American Prize court,91 while Ellsworth had
served as an appeals judge in the Prize case of The Active,9" illustrating
their understanding of and concern for the international law of war." Fi-
nally, Rufus King appears to say that he agreed that Congress' power
should be restricted to a declaration of war because making war "was an
Executive function." This distinction (between making war and declaring
war) was recognized in Bas v. Tingye" and Montoya v. United States.9 In
both cases the Supreme Court found that a declaration of war was a
profound legal act by the Congress," as opposed to the use of force in
armed conflict.9
7
The Founding Fathers surely were concerned with the effects of a
declaration of war on commerce."' Professor Alfred P. Rubin noted that
exercise of belligerent rights.
7 J.B. Moore, supra note 60, at 153-54.
91. 1 J.B. SCOTT, supra note 87, at 2. In November 1775, General Washington urgently
requested the Continental Congress to set up a system of national Prize courts. "Washing-
ton to the President of Congress, Nov. 8 and 11, 1775," in 4 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES, 1745-1799 73, 81-82 (J. Fitzpatrick
ed. 1931-1944). On Nov. 25, 1775, Congress responded by establishing for a trial period Prize
courts. 3 JOURNALS OF THE CoNrINENTAL CONGRESS 371-75 (W. Ford ed. 1904-1937).
92. Bourguignon, Incorporation of the Law of Nations During the American Revolu-
tion - The Case of the San Antonio, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 270, 295 (1977).
93. Id. On some legal effects of war, see, eg., W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 952-54 (3d ed. 1971).
94. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800).
95. 180 U.S. 261 (1901).
96. "We by no means assert that Congress can establish and apply the laws of war
where no war has been declared or exists. Where peace exists the laws of peace must pre-
vail." Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 140 (1866) (concurring opinion of Chase, C.J.,
and Wayne, Swayne and Miller, J.J.).
97. Hague Convention III of 1907, 36 Stat. 2259, 2271 (1967) provides in article I that:
"The Contracting Powers recognize that hostilities between themselves must not commence
without previous and explicit warning, in the form either of a reasoned declaration of war or
of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war." This statement may have been more a
reflection of prior rather than contemporary practice. See, e.g., Moore, who noted: "It is
universally admitted that a formal declaration is not necessary to constitute a state of war."
7 J.B. MOORE, supra note 60, at 171. Nevertheless, the practice continued. See the British
ultimatum to Germany initiating hostilities in the Second World War.
98. In The Rapid, the Supreme Court noted that, upon a declaration of war
a new state of things has occurred - a new character has been assumed by this
nation, which involves it in new relations, and confers on it new rights ....
The nature and consequences of a state of war must direct us to the conclu-
sions which we are to form in this case .... The universal sense of nations has
acknowledged the demoralizing effects that would result from the admission of
individual intercourse. The whole nation are embarked in one common bottom,
and must be reconciled to submit to one common fate. Every individual of the
one nation must acknowledge every individual of the other nation as his own
enemy - because the enemy of his country ... The law of prize is part of the
law of nations. In it, a hostile character is attached to trade, independently of
the character of the trader who pursues or directs it.
12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 160-62.
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the fact that the Constitution entrusted to Congress the power to de-
clare war in the same clause as the power to grant letters of marque
and reprisal makes it overwhelmingly clear to those familiar with
classical legal distinctions that the war-declaring power was connected
with the status of merchants.9
Perhaps the best evidence of this distinction is the Supreme Court's
opinion in Bas v. Tingy.10 0 The case grew out of a dispute involving the
prize owed in the recapture of the Eliza during the "undeclared war"
with France between 1798-1800. A unanimous Court observed that the
United States could wage hostilities without a declaration of war, because
the declaration of war was a distinct constitutional act affecting com-
merce and relations with other States.10' The Court thus recognized that
the country could wage armed conflict 101 absent a declared war. 03
In The Aurora, Pinkney argued that "[tihe rule, that trade with the enemy is illegal,
results necessarily from the declaration of war, and is included in it: there was no necessity
for any subsequent law to enforce the rule." 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 203, 213 (1814). He went on
to argue that "this principle was decided to be correct as early as 1704 and 1707; and it is
presumed, that those decisions were founded upon former cases." Id. at 213-14. Lauterpacht
found the origins of this rule in the 15th century. 2 Lauterpacht, supra note 86, at 261.
Moreover, it was "settled doctrine" that the declaration of war extinguished commercial
relations between citizens of belligerent States. "The doctrine is not at this day to be ques-
tioned, that during a state of hostility, the citizens of the hostile states are incapable of
contracting with each other." Scholefield v. Eichelberger, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 586, 593 (1833).
Accord Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 126 (1833) (Declaration of war
authorizes Congress under international law, to enact legislation to seize enemy property
within the territorial U.S.); Jecker v. Montgomery, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 112. (During a state
of war, "all intercourse and communication" between the belligerents' citizens is prohibited
by "the law of nations"); The William Bagaley, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) at 405. ("Public war, duly
declared or recognized as such by the war-making power, imports a prohibition by the sover-
eign to the subjects or citizens of all commercial intercourse and correspondence with citi-
zens or persons domiciled in the enemy country."); Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at
535 (1867). (It is a universal principle of international law that when war is "duly declared
or recognized" all commercial transactions are extinguished); Coppell v. Hall, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 542, 557 (1868). (Under international law, contracts made during war are "utterly
void").
99. A.P. Rubin, supra note 87, at 283-84. This point is completely missed by Judge
Sofaer, who interpreted the clause on letters of marque and reprisal, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 11, as granting to Congress the constitutional basis for directing the use of armed force
short of war, a proposition which finds no support in the classic legal literature. A. SOFAER,
supra note 83, at 32. While letters of marque and reprisal could be issued in peacetime, as
was done in the "undeclared war" with France in 1793, it would nevertheless be a causus
belli under international law and, therefore, a means to trigger a declaration of war.
100. 4 U.S. 37.
101. 4 U.S. at 40. See Talbot v. Seemans, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 18-20 (1801) (The U.S.
and France were in "partial war"). This case is discussed infra at note 197.
102. Professor Franck has noted that "[s]ince the decision of the Supreme Court in Bas
v. Tingy in 1800 and in the Prize cases in 1862, and up to and including the Vietnam cases
of 1971 to 1973, the courts have refused to sustain the proposition that the use of force by
the President is unconstitutional except after a formal declaration of war by the Congress."
T. FRANCK, CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE UNTIL VIETNAM: CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT AND FOR-
EIGN POLICY 16 (1984).
103. But even this persuasive distinction is blurred by the ambiguous use of "war" at
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This distinction was also drawn by Daniel Webster, who noted that:
This act [of May 28, 1798], it is true, authorized the use of force,
under certain circumstances, and for certain objects, against French
vessels. But there may be acts of authorized force; there may be as-
saults; there may be battles; there may be captures of ships and im-
prisonment of persons, and yet no general war. Cases of this kind may
occur under . . . the laws and usages of nations, and which all the
writers distinguish from general war.' °0
Professor Rubin concluded that
the Constitution contains two distinct legal [war] powers. The power
to order troops into action, bringing the law of war into play with
regard to that action but not with regard to uninvolved merchants,
belongs to the President. The power to change general relations be-
tween the United States and any other country from the regime of the
international law of peace to the regime of the international law of
war belongs to the Congress. There is no reason legally or historically
to view either of those powers as a limit on the other, and the refusal
of the President to order forces into battle regardless of a Constitu-
tional declaration of war, like the refusal of the Congress to declare
war regardless of a Presidential order of military action, illustrates the
political tensions built into the Constitution for sound legal and polit-
ical reasons. 105
The Framers appear to have regarded the declaration of war as distinct
from the use of armed force, such as the numerous Indian "wars" and the
two Barbary "wars," and even the French intervention in the U.S. war of
independence.
It is impossible to state with certainty, however, the intent of the
Founding Fathers. As Justice Jackson noted in the Steel Seizure Case,
the time of the Constitutional Convention. "War," at that time, usually was perceived in its
international legal sense, which could not have escaped notice by the Founding Fathers. On
the other hand, "war" was sometimes used colloquially to mean "combat." This ambiguity
was reflected in the Articles of Confederation, which provided that "[tihe United States, in
Congress assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on
peace and war .... " and that "[tihe United States ... shall never engage in a war ... in
time of peace .... Art. 9, paras. 1 & 6. This ambiguity led at least one author to equate,
erroneously, the power to "declare war" with the power "to authorize the international use
of force." Note, The Future of the War Powers Resolution, 36 STAN. L. Rav. 1407, 1417
(1984).
104. Speech on French Spoilations, 4 THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF DANIEL WEBSTER
164 (1903). Webster went on to note that
On the same day in which this act passed .... Congress passed another act,
entitled 'An act authorizing the President of the United States to raise a provi-
sional army; and the first section declared, that the President should be au-
thorized, 'in the event of a declaration of war against the United States, or of
actual invasion of their territory, by a foreign power, or of imminent danger of
such invasion,' to cause to be enlisted ten thousand men.
Id. at 164-65.
105. A.P. Rubin, "The President and the Congress at War - Part I" (unpublished
paper 1984).
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the "partisan debate and scholarly speculation yields no net result but
only supplies more or less apt quotations from respected sources on each
side of any question."' 1  In fact, it is quite likely the Founding Fathers
disagreed among themselves on the nature of the War Power, preferring
for the sake of political expediency to leave the issue unresolved and to
let future generations grapple with the question.107 It should come as no
surprise that John Quincy Adams observed that "[t]he respective powers
of the President and Congress of the United States, in the case of war
with foreign powers are yet undetermined. Perhaps they can never be
determined. '"108
One of the few things that is clear is that advocates can muster au-
thority for just about any interpretation of original intent on the War
Power. Therefore, perhaps the more reliable path to an understanding of
the War Power is to analyze the structure of the Constitution itself to
106. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 634-35 (Jackson, J., concurring).
107. Another view is that much of the "foreign affairs power" is not mentioned in the
Constitution because the Founding Fathers assumed the new government had the powers
any State may possess under international law. Justice Story observed that powers in the
Constitution flow not only from the aggregate of enumerated powers but also "from the
aggregate powers of the national government." For instance, Story argued, since the Consti-
tution omits reference to extending jurisdiction over conquered territory, one must look to
the nature of government (and not Amendment X) for this power. "This would perhaps
rather be a result from the whole mass of the powers of the national government, and from
the nature of political society, than a consequence or incident of the powers specially enu-
merated." 2 J. STORY, supra note 40, at 148. See also Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202,
212 (1890). Cf. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 294 (1936). In The Chinese Exclu-
sion Cases, the Court noted that Congress possessed jurisdiction over and could, therefore,
exclude aliens (even though there is no specific constitutional authority) since
U]urisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an incident of every inde-
pendent nation. It is a part of its independence .... [T]he United States, in
their relation to foreign countries and their subjects or citizens are one nation,
invested with powers which belong to independent nations, the exercise of
which can be invoked for the maintenance of its absolute independence and
security throughout its entire territory.
130 U.S. 581, 603-04 (1889). See also Burnett v. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378, 396 (1933); MacKen-
zie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915).
Perhaps the most radical exposition of this thesis was by Mr. Justice Sutherland in
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., where it was stated that
the investment of the federal government with the powers of external sover-
eignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution. The
powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to main-
tain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been men-
tioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the federal government as
necessary concomitants of nationality .... The power to acquire territory by
discovery and occupation, the power to expel undesirable aliens, the power to
make such international agreements as do not constitute treaties in the consti-
tutional sense, none of which is expressly affirmed by the Constitution, never-
theless exist as inherently inseparable from the conception of nationality. This
the court recognized, and... found the warrant for its conclusions not in the
provisions of the Constitution, but in the law of nations.
299 U.S. at 364 (citations omitted).
108. J.Q. ADAMS, EULOGY ON MADISON 47 (1836).
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determine, from an architectural perspective, where the power should
resides.
4. The Separation of Institutions and Powers
John Roche observed that ours is a government of separated institu-
tions sharing powers. 10' The Supreme Court has noted that "[t]he princi-
ple of separation of powers was not simply an abstract generalization in
the minds of the Framers; it was woven into the document that they
drafted in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787."11' "This separation is not
merely a matter of convenience or of governmental mechanism. Its object
is basic and vital, namely, to preclude a commingling of these essentially
different powers of government in the same hands."'11 In this regard, the
Framers of our Constitution were profoundly influenced by Montes-
quieu,"' whose injunction against the concentration of political power in
any single branch of government was reflected in the Constitution's bal-
ance of powers."' Montesquieu observed:
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same per-
son, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; be-
cause apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate
should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.
Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated
from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative,
the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary con-
109. See also Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190 (1880); Kendall v. United
States, 37 U.S. (12 Peters) 524, 610 (1838). The doctrine of the separation of powers is
nowhere stated in our Constitution; rather, it is "a conclusion logically following from the
separation of the several departments." Springer v. Government Philippine Islands, 277
U.S. 189, 201 (1928). Accord Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. at 89.
110. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 124. The separation of powers "is at the heart of our
Constitution .... Id. at 119. Accord Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951-52, 962; Springer v. Govern-
ment Phillippine Islands, 277 U.S. at 201. Cf. Miller & Knapp, The Congressional Veto:
Preserving the Constitutional Framework, 52 IND. L.J. 367, 390 (1977) ("It is doubtful that
the concept of separation of powers can really have any objective meaning.").
111. O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933).
112. Madison observed that "[t]he oracle who is always consulted and cited on this
subject is the celebrated Montesquieu." The Federalist No. 47 (J. Madison), supra note 42,
at 244. Although Montesquieu profoundly influenced the Framers, his injunctions were more
in the nature of philosophical views than a blueprint of English government. Professor
Fisher quotes Justice Holmes as saying that Montesquieu's "England - the England of the
threefold division of power into legislative, executive and judicial - was a fiction invented
by him .... " L. FISHER, supra note 44, at 248. Indeed, Fisher argued that
[o]ur structure of government owes its existence to the experiences of the
framers, not the theory of Montesquieu or precedents borrowed from England.
The framers used Montesquieu selectively, adopting what they knew from
their own experience to be useful and rejecting what they knew to be inappli-
cable. The product was more theirs than his.
L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 10 (1985).
113. Montesquieu's view that the maintenance of independence as between the legisla-
tive, the executive and the judicial branches was a "security for the people" and had the
"full approval" of the Framers. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. at 116.
VOL. 16:1
THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
troul; for the judge would then be the legislator. Were it joined to the
executive power, the judge might behave with violence and
oppression."'4
In The Federalist No. 47, Madison found that when Montesquieu
said that governmental powers should be separated, he (Montesquieu)
did not mean isolated or fully independent.
[H]e did not mean that these departments ought to have no partial
agency in, or no controul over the acts of each other. His meaning...
can amount to no more than this, that where the whole power of one
department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole
power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free
constitution, are subverted. '
The Framers were rather pragmatic and motivated by a belief that
political powers should not be divided completely among institutions,
only that institutions should be independent of one another. ' Thus, said
Madison, the three branches of Government "ought to be kept as sepa-
rate from, and independent of each other as the nature of free govern-
ment will admit; or as is consistent with the chain of connection, that
binds the whole fabric of the constitution in one indissoluble bond of
unity and amity. '11
7
The powers of government, however, were to be shared, so that each
branch would have a check upon the other. "Even a cursory examination
of the Constitution reveals the influence of Montesquieu's thesis that
checks and balances were the foundation of a structure of government
that would protect liberty.""" Madison argued in The Federalist No. 48
that the political powers of each department should not "be wholly un-
connected with each other"
unless these departments be so far connected and blended, as to give
to each a constitutional controul over the others, the degree of separa-
tion which the maxim requires as essential to a free government, can
never in practice, be duly maintained.
114. Quoted in CONSTrrUONAL LAW: CASES AND OTHER PROBLEMs 649 (4th ed. P.
Freund, A. Sutherland, M. Howe, E. Brown, eds. 1977).
115. The Federalist No. 47 (J. Madison), supra note 42, at 245 (emphasis deleted).
116. This concept is often misunderstood. See, eg., Vance, Striking The Balance: Con-
gress And The President Under The War Powers Resolution, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 84
(1984) (arguing that the war power does "not fit neatly into the classic concept of the sepa-
ration of . . .powers. Instead, the area is one of shared and overlapping responsibilities
117. The Federalist No. 47 (J. Madison), supra note 42, at 246, quoting with approval
the New Hampshire Constitution (emphasis deleted).
The Supreme Court observed in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 120, that there is "com-
mon ground in the recognition of the intent of the Framers that the powers of the three
great branches of the National Government be largely separate from one another."
118. Bowsher v. Synar, -- U.S. -- , 106 S.Ct. 3181, 92 L. Ed. 2d 583 (1986) (Striking
down the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
1985).
1987
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
It is agreed on all sides, that the powers properly belonging to one
of the departments, ought not to be directly and compleatly adminis-
tered by either of the other departments. It is equally evident, that
neither of them ought to possess directly or indirectly, an overruling
influence over the others in the administration of their respective
powers. It will not be denied, that power is of an encroaching nature,
and that it ought to be effectually restrained from passing the limits
assigned to it. After discriminating therefore in theory, the several
classes of power, as they may in their nature be legislative, executive,
or judiciary; the next and most difficult task, is to provide some prac-
tical security for each against the invasion of the others. What this
security ought to be, is the great problem to be solved. 9
Perhaps the quintessential example of this sharing of powers is the
War Power, which is divided between the political branches.1 20 One can
discern the constitutional repository for the power to decide to deploy
U.S. armed forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities from an exami-
nation of the theory and practice of the separation of powers or, put an-
other way, "by their nature, and by the principles of our institutions."''
There are two paths to find the constitutional resting place of this
power. The first is the "more like" line of inquiry: Is the power to decide
to deploy U.S. armed forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities more
like the power to raise and support the army, or is it more like the power
to command the forces once deployed? This is a theoretical inquiry in-
volving an analysis of specifically enumerated war-related powers. The
119. The Federalist No. 48 (J. Madison), supra note 42, at 250.
120. RoSTOW, supra note 61, at 847. See also E. KEYNES, UNDECLARED WAR (1982); A.
SOFAER, supra note 83, at 1-60. In Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689, 705 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd
mem. 411 U.S. 911 (1973), the district court noted that "the courts that have considered the
war-making power of the United States have all agreed that such power is shared by the
executive and legislature to the exclusion of the courts." See also Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.
2d 611, 613-14 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Massachusetts v. Laird , 451 F. 2d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1971);
Berk v. Laird, 429 F. 2d 302, 305 (2nd Cir. 1970), afj'd sub nom., Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d
1039 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971), Drinan v. Nixon, 364 F. Supp. 854,
859 (D. Mass. 1973).
The conduct of foreign relations generally is reserved to the political branches. Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). "The conduct of the foreign relations
of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative...
Departments." Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 3-2 (1918). See also Chicago &
Southern Airlines v. Waterman Steamship Co., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948). U.S. v. First Na-
tional Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 901 (2nd Cir. 1968). This does not mean that "every case or
controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962). It is clear that
[t]he courts have the authority to construe treaties and executive agreements,
and it goes without saying that interpreting congressional legislation is a recur-
ring and accepted task for the federal courts. . .. We cannot shirk this respon-
sibility merely because our decision may have significant political overtones.
Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society -- U.S. -- , 54 U.S.L.W. 4929,
4931 (June 30, 1986).
121. Ex parte Milligan 71 U.S. (4. Wall.) at 139 (concurring opinion of Chase, C.J., and
Wayne, Swayne and Miller, JJ.)
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other line of inquiry is to look for constitutional analogies to determine
where this power most properly resides. This will be done by an examina-
tion of cases involving the separation of powers.
a. Constitutional division of war-related powers.
As noted previously, the Constitution specifically assigns certain
powers to Congress and others to the President.'22
The power to make the necessary laws is in Congress; the power to
execute in the President. Both powers imply many subordinate and
auxiliary powers. Each includes all authorities essential to its due ex-
ercise. But neither can the President, in war more than in peace, in-
trude upon the proper authority of the Congress, nor Congress upon
the proper authority of the President. Both are servants of the people
whose will is expressed in the fundamental law. 2'
i. The Congress
Congress' powers include the raising of armed forces,'1 24 appropriating
funds to support them, 25 prescribing rules to regulate their conduct2 "
and, most importantly, the power to declare war. 27 Moreover, the Senate
must approve Presidential nominees for promotion in the armed
services. 28
The War Powers Resolution appears to be founded upon only one of
Congress' powers: the power to declare war. It is clear, or at least well
settled by custom and usage, that the Congress' power is not wider, since
the President may send U.S. armed forces anywhere in the world, at any
time he pleases,1 29 subject only to restrictions in the law,'3 0 including (ar-
guably) the War Powers Resolution. The theory underlying the War Pow-
ers Resolution is that the use of force may catapult the United States
into a war, depriving the Congress of its power to decide whether or not
122. Moreover, a fundamental constitutional distinction exists between powers exer-
cised in domestic and foreign affairs. See, eg., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304.
123. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 139 (concurring opinion of Chase, C.J., and
Wayne , Swayne and Miller, JJ.). In his veto message of the War Powers Resolution, Presi-
dent Nixon stated: "The authorization and appropriations process represent one of the ways
in which such influence can be excercised." "Veto of War Powers Resolution," supra note 2.
See also Glennon, Strengthening the War Powers Resolution: The Case for Purse-String
Restrictions, 60 MINN. L. REV. 1, 28-38 (1975). But see the possible constitutional conflict
raised in note and text accompanying note 200 and as a possible limitation upon this power.
124. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12 & 13.
125. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12 & 13.
126. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
127. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
128. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, para. 2.
129. See supra note 114.
130. Such as prohibitions to spend funds for combat forces in a certain place. See, eg.,
Act of July 1, 1973, supra note 14.
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to declare war.1 " Thus, the President's use of force may on this ground
be restrained. This reasoning is historically and constitutionally flawed.' s
At least since the outset of the 20th century, this country has run
little or no risk of becoming embroiled in a declared war because of the
use of American troops without congressional approval. In the two largest
military actions short of war, Korea and Vietnam, ' the Congress will-
ingly and continuously exercised its power in support of the use of troops
in combat by raising armed forces through conscription and supporting
them with ongoing appropriations. In the numerous minor incidents in
which the President has ordered troops into hostilities, such as the Do-
minican Republic in 1965-1966 and Grenada in 1983, there was little risk
of declared war.
ii. The President
The President's powers flow from his broad mandate; he is: vested
with the "executive power, 1 3 4 Commander in Chief' 3 and the sole organ
131. Professor Henkin offers an alternative and interesting theory. He sees the policy
aspect of the use of force as a source for Congressional war powers. See Henkin, 'A More
Effective System' For Foreign Relations: The Constitutional Framework, 61 VA. L. REV.
751, 764 (1975).
132. This reasoning also ignores the fact that in the conduct of contemporary diplo-
macy, a wide variety of factors not involving the use of U.S. military forces might lead to
war, such as food embargoes, economic sanctions, economic assistance to a State involved in
an armed conflict and so forth. For instance, it is widely believed that the Japanese attack
on Pearl Harbor which triggered the U.S.' entry into the Second World War, was caused in
part by U.S. economic policies towards Imperial Japan. See generally B.H. LIDDELL HART,
HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 199 (1970); G. PRANGE, AT DAWN WE SLEPT: THE UN-
TOLD STORY OF PEARL HARBOR (1981). Surely, the Congress may not control or interfere with
the President in these areas pursuant to its power to declare war; therefore, Congress' War
Power has limits. Based upon the writings of the Founding Fathers, international law at the
time and Revolutionary War-era Prize cases, there is little reason to doubt that the phrase
"declare war" meant anything other than what it says.
133. Professor Henkin observed that
[o]f the numerous recent 'uses' of force, only Korea and Vietnam would have
been clearly covered [by the War Powers Resolution]. Had such legislation
been in effect, President Truman would perhaps have acted anyhow, but might
have been impelled to seek Congressional approval within thirty days. Vietnam
was expressly authorized, and, presumably, any Tonkin Resolution would have
clearly authorized hostilities beyond thirty days as we:-.
L. HENKIN, supra note 55, at 103.
134. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. "The executive power was given in general terms, strength-
ened by specific terms where emphasis was regarded as appropriate, and was limited by
direct expressions where limitation was needed . Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. at
118.
135. See infra text accompanying notes 139-149.
Alexander Hamilton distinguished between the broad language of article II, § 1 and the
specific grants in article I, § 1. "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States." 7 WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 76 (H.C. Lodge ed.
1851). Hamilton concluded that "[t]he [article II] enumeration [in §§ 2 & 3] ought therefore
to be considered, as intended merely to specify the principal articles implied in the defini-
tion of executive power; leaving the rest to flow from the general grant of that power, inter-
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for the conduct of foreign relations.' so These are amorphous but ex-
tremely potent powers, which led the Supreme Court to observe that
"[t]he difference between the grant of legislative power under article I to
Congress, which is limited to powers therein enumerated, and the more
general grant of the executive power to the President under article II is
significant." '
A President may act upon the sum of his powers, while congressional
action requires a specific constitutional provision, sweeping though it may
be (consider the commerce power, for instance). Thus, a theoretical anal-
ysis may be reduced to a single question: Does the power to decide to
deploy U.S. armed forces into areas of hostilities or imminent hostilities
flow to Congress from one of its specific powers, or to the President under
his broad mandate of executive powers?
(A) Commander in Chief Power
It has been stated repeatedly, and wrongly, in my view, that the font
of the President's War Power is his constitutional appointment as Com-
mander in Chief."'8 One former Chief Executive and Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court observed that "[t]he President is the Commander-in-
Chief of the army and navy, and the militia when called into the service
of the United States. Under this, he can order the army and navy any-
where he will, if the appropriations furnish the means of transporta-
tion." I 9 This is probably not the power upon which the President prop-
erly may ground a decision to decide to deploy U.S. armed forces into a
new armed conflict, although it is the power to wage war effectively.4 0 It
is, therefore, a very potent power. For example, it was in the exercise of
this power that Franklin Roosevelt agreed with Winston Churchill during
preted in conformity with other parts of the constitution." Id. at 80-81.
136. See supra note 74.
137. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. at 128.
138. In his concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure Case, Justice Jackson observed that
the Commander in Chief power implies "something more than an empty title. But just what
authority goes with the name has plagued presidential advisers who would not waive or
narrow it by non assertion yet cannot say where it begins or ends." 343 U.S. at 641.
139. W. TAFT, THE PRESIDENT AND His POWERS 94-95 (1916). During the debate sur-
rounding the Congressional approval of the Act of March 3, 1909, 35 Stat. 773-74, requiring
the President to maintain a complement of marines on Navy capital ships and cruisers of
not less than 8 percent of the enlisted strength, Senator Borah stated:
Congress has not the power to say that an army shall be at a particular place
at a particular time or shall manouver in a particular instance. That belongs
exclusively to the Commander in Chief of the Army. The dividing line is be-
tween the question of raising, supporting and regulating an army, and com-
manding it. It is difficult to define, for the reason that it is difficult to tell
where the dividing line is. But when it is ascertained, there is no question
about the constitutional provision covering it.
43 CONG. REC. 2452 (1909).
140. T. EAGLETON, WAR AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER: A CHRONICLE OF CONGRESSIONAL
SURRENDER 113 (1974); Wallace, supra note 85, at 744-52 et seq.
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the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 that their countries would
demand the "unconditional surrender" of the three Axis powers; 41 a deci-
sion of profound significance for the war effort. Similarly, President Lin-
coln based the emancipation proclamation upon the Commander in Chief
power, claiming it was justified by military necessity. 42 Further, Presi-
dent Truman based his decision to drop the atomic bomb on Japan but
not to use it in the Korean conflict upon the Commander in Chief power.
The Commander in Chief delegation was intended to insure civilian
control of the military 43 and, once hostilities existed, to vest the power to
wage the struggle in the President.14 In one of the most often quoted
141. For an interesting and well researched account of this momentous decision , see 7
M. GILBERT, WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: THE ROAD TO VICTORY, 1941-1945 309 (1986); H. FEIS,
CHURCHILL, ROOSEVELT, STALIN: THE WAR THEY WAGED AND THE PEACE THEY SOUGHT 108-11
(2d ed. 1967). Roosevelt stated:
Peace can come to the world only by the total elimination of German and Jap-
anese war power .... The elimination of German, Japanese, and Italian war
power means the unconditional surrender by Germany, Italy, and Japan. That
means a reasonable assurance of future world peace. It does not mean the de-
struction of the population of Germany, Italy, or Japan, but it does mean the
destruction of the philosophies in those countries which are based on conquest
and the subjugation of other people.
Quoted in id. at 109.
142. See supra note 143.
143. 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 74, 79 (1861). See also L. HENKIN, supra note 55, at 50; A.
SCHLESINGER, supra note 55, at 6. "By making the Commander in Chief a civilian who would
be subject to recall after four years, the Founders doubtless hoped to spare America tribula-
tions of the sort that the unfettered command and consequent political power of a Duke of
Marlborough had brought to England." Id.
The Commander in Chief power may and, in fact, has crossed the threshold and become
a substantive power. Perhaps the best example of this is when President Abraham Lincoln
used this power as his constitutional authority for the Emancipation Proclamation. Lincoln
claimed this was a necessary military measure to shorten the Civil War. W. WHITING, WAR
POWERS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 66 (10th ed. 1864, reprinted in
1971). See also G. MILTON, THE USE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 1789-1943 118 (1965). Whether
or not the Emancipation Proclamation was needed for military reasons, it certainly aided
Lincoln politically in the northern states. Of all the Presidents, Lincoln made the widest
and most frequent use of this power. Id. at 316.
144. The Founding Fathers wanted to assure that control of military activities was not
vested in the Congress because of the experience of war by committee during the war of
independence. It was in this vein that Hamilton wrote that "[ If all the cares or concerns of
government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish
the excercise of power by a single hand." The Federalist No. 74 (A. Hamilton), supra note
42, at 376.
It has been observed that:
Congress has the power not only to raise and support and govern armies but to
declare war. It has, therefore, the power to provide by law for carrying on war.
This power necessarily extends to all legislation essential to the prosecution of
war with vigor and success, except such as interfere with the command of the
forces and the conduct of campaigns. That power and duty belongs to the
President as commander-in-chief.
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 139 (Chase, C.J., and Wayne, Swayne, and Miller,
JJ., concurring) (emphasis added). In Swaim v. United States, 28 Ct. Cl. 173, 221 (1893),
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passages of The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton opined that the power of
the Commander in Chief "amount[ed] to nothing more than the supreme
command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General
and Admiral .... -' Although the Commander in Chief power is broad
and involves policy-making when war (and, perhaps, even high intensity
armed conflict) exists,"' this power was neither intended to nor does it
authorize the President to make the policy decision to involve U.S. armed
forces in combat, with the exception of areas such as self-defense and
preemptive strikes.1 7 Justice Jackson, in his concurring opinion in the
Steel Seizure Case, rejected the notion that it vests the President with
the "power to do anything, anywhere, that can be done with an army or
navy. 1 4 8 Chief Justice Stone observed in the Nazi Saboteurs Case that
the Constitution "invests the President as Commander in Chief with
power to wage war which Congress has declared, and to carry into effect
all laws passed by Congress for the conduct of war and for the govern-
ment and regulation of the Armed Forces." 9 In United States v.
Sweeny,150 the Supreme Court observed that the Commander in Chief
power "is evidently to vest in the President the supreme command over
all the military forces, - such supreme and undivided command as would
be necessary to the prosecution of a successful war."' ' Surely we would
not claim that the joint chiefs of staff have the constitutional authority to
decide, as a matter of national political policy, that armed force as op-
posed to negotiation should be employed in a given situation. How, then,
can it be that the "first General and Admiral" is to be treated differently?
The Commander in Chief power gives the President the authority to de-
ploy armed forces, but not to decide to deploy them.
(B) Foreign Policy Power
The decision to use American troops, in situations short of war, is
clearly related to the conduct of U.S. foreign policy-an executive, rather
than a legislative, function.15 The President'1 3 is responsible for sending
aff'd, 165 U.S. 553 (1897), the Court of Claims noted that "Congress may increase the Army,
or reduce the Army, or abolish it altogether . . . but so long as we have a military force
Congress can not take away from the President the supreme command."
145. The Federalist No. 69 (A. Hamilton), supra note 42, at 350. See also Fleming v.
Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 615 (1850). (The Commander in Chief power did not "extend
the operation of our institutions and laws beyond the limits before assigned to them by the
legislative power.")
146. This includes certain powers affecting citizens within the United States. See E.
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1984 231, 242 et seq. (5th rev. ed. 1984).
Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., supra.
147. See L. HENKIN, supra note 55, at 53. But see Rehnquist, The Constitutional Is-
sues - Administration Position, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 628, 631-32 (1970).
148. 343 U.S. at 641-42 (Jackson, J., concurring).
149. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 26 (1942).
150. 157 U.S. 281 (1895).
151. 157 U.S. at 284.
152. The State Department took the position at one point that the President's use of
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and recalling ambassadors, opening and closing embassies, formulating
and coordinating geopolitical strategy, negotiating trade agreements, en-
tering into executive agreements, presenting and prosecuting interna-
tional claims, and a host of other international activities inherent in the
foreign policy power. There is no question that the projection of military
power is a means of conducting foreign policy."" Diplomacy and the use
of force "are complementary aspects to the.., art of conducting relations
with other states."155 Thus, "foreign policy and war are on a contin-
uum." 56 Consider, for example, the "Carter Doctrine." In his State of the
Union address on January 23, 1980, President Carter proclaimed: "An at-
tempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will
be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States. It
will be repelled by use of any means necessary, including military
force."' 7 Similarly, in his State of the Union address on December 2,
1823, fearing the reconquest of Spanish America by the Holy Alliance in
favor of the Bourbons, President James Monroe declared that the United
States "should consider any attempt ... to extend [foreign intervention]
to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and
safety."' 8 This became known as the Monroe Doctrine.' 59 President
force in foreign policy is outside the Congress' direct power to control.
Not only has the President the authority to use the Armed Forces in car-
rying out the broad foreign policy of the United States and implementing trea-
ties, but it is equally clear that his authority may not be interfered with by the
Congress in the excercise of powers which it has under the Constitution.
Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to Duty in the European Area: Hear-
ings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, 82d Cong., 1st
Sess. 92-93 (1951) (statement of Secretary of State Dean Acheson), reprinted in THE POW-
ERS OF THE PRESIDENT AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMY AND NAVY OF THE UNITED
STATES 66, 71 (D. Schaffer & D. Mathews eds. 1974). The implication of this testimony is
that the constitutional restraints on the use of force in the conduct of foreign policy are the
same as those which apply to the normal conduct of diplomacy.
153. In foreign policy making, Americans tend to adopt an anthropomorphic view. Of
course, the President does not single-handedly make foreign policy decisions; rather, there
are any number of departments of the U.S. Government which daily contribute to the for-
eign policy process. For instance, there are 26 federal government agencies, departments and
offices which regularly participate in international trade policy making.
154. Clausewitz observed that the use of force is yet another means of conducting polit-
ics. K. CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 101 (1968).
155. R. ARON, PEACE AND WAR: A THEORY OF INTERNATIC'AL RELATIONS 24 (1966).
156. Wallace, supra note 85, at 733.
157. "Transcript of President's State of the Union Address to Joint Session of Con-
gress," N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1980, at A 12, col. 3.
158. The Monroe Doctrine, reprinted in R. MORRIS, supra note 87, at 99.
159. In his State of the Union address on December 2, 1845, President James Polk
reasserted the Monroe Doctrine, expanding it to prohibit diplomatic intervention by outside
powers in the New World. He concluded that "[tihe people of the United States can not,
therefore, view with indifference attempts of European powers to interfere with the inde-
pendent action of any nation on this continent." Admittedly, the Monroe Doctrine was
transformed from a defensive measure to a justification for intervention by President Theo-
dore Roosevelt in his State of the Union address on December 6, 1904, in what later became
known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, during the heyday of American
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Woodrow Wilson issued the Fourteen Points in a declaration that had
profound consequences for American foreign policy.160 Historian Arthur
Schlesinger noted that "[t]he Fourteen Points were of critical significance
to the war and peace, but this was entirely a presidential initiative, with-
out congressional consultation or clearance."'' Other notable instances
where Presidents have set American foreign policy which implicated the
use of force include: the stationing of combat troops in Iceland in July
1941, the Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941, and the Truman Doctrine
of March 2, 1947, from which sprang the policy of containment. On Octo-
ber 23, 1962, President John F. Kennedy issued the Proclamation of a
Quarantine of Offensive Weapons to Cuba during the Cuban Missile Cri-
sis. '6 President Kennedy ordered the U.S. Navy to blockade the ship-
ment of offensive weapons to Cuba, using force if necessary, and unques-
tionably bringing this country to the brink of war.
Moreover, is there any doubt that the decision whether or not to rec-
ognize another country, to establish an embassy and to exchange ambas-
sadors, is an executive function? Could the Congress order the President
to recognize a country? Could the Congress block the President's recogni-
tion of a country? The Supreme Court answered these questions with a
resounding "no" in United States v. Pink'63 and United States v. Bel-
mont,6" holding that as the "sole organ of the federal government in the
field of international relations,' 65 these powers, either explicitly or im-
plicitly, belong to the President. In fact, one proponent of the War Pow-
ers Resolution conceded that "the President undoubtedly possesses an
exclusive power to initiate a military commitment, power that Congress
may not negate or otherwise control."' 66
Perhaps the zenith of Congress' foray into the field of foreign rela-
tions was in the inter-war period, 1919-1939, when isolationists blocked
the U.S.' adherence to the Versailles Treaty, entry into the League of
Nations, rejection of American participation in the Permanent Court of
International Justice and a host of other activities. History has revealed
the failure of these policies and the Congress' role in their formulation.
(C) Executive Power
Even within the foreign affairs context, the President is vested with
perhaps the broadest of all delegations of authority-the Executive
power. It is axiomatic that the Constitution was created to supersede the
gunboat diplomacy.
160. The Fourteen Points, in R. MORRIS, supra note 8.7, at 153.
161. A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 55, at 93.
162. "Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba," Proclamation No.
3504, 27 Fed. Reg. 10,401, reprinted in 47 Dep't State Bull. 717 (1962).
163. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203.
164. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324.
165. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. at 320. See supra note 74.
166. Buchanan, supra note 16, at 1170.
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Articles of Confederation, that a stronger and effective central govern-
ment was preferred to a weak one."'7 The raison d'etre of the constitu-
tional blueprint was to replace administration by legislative committee
(and not much of an administration, at that) with government by a single
magistrate. Whether or not the Founding Fathers harbored an original
intention that the President would have the power to decide to deploy
armed forces into areas of hostilities or imminent hostilities, it is beyond
question today that, of the three branches of government, this is most
appropriately an Executive function, both by constitutional design and by
the reality of conducting foreign policy.
This analysis is also supported by the constitutional concept of
checks and balances. It is beyond doubt that Congress may control the
President's use of the armed forces, among other ways, simply by placing
limitations upon appropriations. Moreover, the Executive branch is re-
quired to continue to report to the Congress because of its oversight re-
sponsibilities and to continue to obtain funds. On a political level, the
President must maintain good relations with Congress, lest he find politi-
cal pressure applied along a spectrum of activities. Admittedly, Congress'
checks against Presidential action cannot be implemented quickly." 8
Then again, the constitutional checks and balances were not intended to
act speedily.
That this system of division and separation of powers produces con-
flicts, confusion, and discordance at times is inherent, but it was de-
liberately so structured to assure full, vigorous and open debate on the
great issues affecting the people and to provide avenues for the opera-
tion of checks on the exercise of governmental power.'6 9
However, "Congressional unwillingness to use its constitutional powers
cannot be deemed a sufficient reason for inventing new ways to act. '91 0
The Congress can no more appropriate the power to decide to deploy
U.S. armed forces into areas of hostilities or imminent hostilities, without
specific legislation, e.g., to conduct U.S. naval exercises off the Libyan
coast or to escort ships in the Persian Gulf, than it could to recognize or
to sever relations with another country.
a. Case law
The seminal case on the separation of branches of our government is
Myers v. United States. 1 7 Myers arose when the President dismissed the
Postmaster of Seattle, despite a law requiring the advice and consent of
the Senate. In a thorough and scholarly analysis of the separation of gov-
167. See generally The Federalist No. 70 (A. Hamilton), supra note 42.
168. See infra note 201.
169. Bowsher v. Synar, -- U.S. at -- , 54 U.S.L.W. 5064, 5066 (U.S. July 2, 1986).
170. Consumer Energy Council of America, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion, 673 F.2d 425, 477 (1982).
171. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52.
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ernmental branches and powers, the Court reasoned that the constitu-
tional blueprint required a constant tension between the political
branches of government.17' This tension was designed to prevent any sin-
gle branch from usurping the power of another. Since the Constitution
itself was silent with respect to the power of removal,1 7 3 the Court looked
to how the tension between the political branches was to be maintained.
In examining the structure of government, the Court quoted Madison,
who observed:
The powers relative to offices are partly Legislative and partly Execu-
tive. The Legislature creates the office, defines the powers, limits its
duration and annexes a compensation. This done, the Legislative
power ceases. They ought to have nothing to do with designating the
man to fill the office. That I conceive to be of an Executive nature....
We ought always to consider the Constitution with an eye to the prin-
ciples upon which it was founded .... [I]f the Legislature determines
the powers, the honors, and emoluments of an office, we should be
insecure if they were to designate the officer also. The nature of things
restrains and confines the Legislative and Executive authorities in this
respect; and hence it is said that the Constitution stipulates for the
independence of each branch of the Government. " "
Here was an explanation of the theory upon which the checks and
balances were grounded. The Legislature and the Executive should have
the ability to impose their wills on the other, to some extent, each within
its constitutional mandate.17 5 This led the Court to conclude that to allow
Congress to have a "veto" over the dismissal of an officer of the Executive
branch amounted to an overreaching of power, vesting too much control
in Congress. 1 6 Besides, the power to dismiss an official is more properly
172. For in this tension, or rivalry for supremacy, the Founding Fathers placed their
hopes for co-equal branches which would prevent the collection of political powers in one
branch or individual. See generally The Federalist No. 48 (J. Madison), supra note 42.
Justice Brandeis noted in his dissenting opinion in Myers that
[tihe doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the convention of
1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the excercise of arbitrary
power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but by means of the inevitable
friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three
departments, to save the people from autocracy.
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. at 293 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See further M. FARRAND,
supra note 35, at 400 (statement of Mr. Dayton in the Senate, Nov. 4, 1803).
173. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 gives the President the power to make appointments,
subject to the advice and consent of the Senate.
174. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. at 128-129.
175. See, e.g., Chadha, 462 U.S. at 955 & n. 21.
176. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 131-32, the Court held that Congress could not
appoint a majority of the voting members of an independent commission (Federal Election
Commission) because it violated the Appointments Clause. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
This amounted to an unconstitutional infringement upon executive power since the Presi-
dent is to nominate and, with the Senate's advice and consent, shall appoint all "Officers of
the United States," even though "Congress has express authority to regulate congressional
elections, by virtue of the power conferred in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. The Court's holding,
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an Executive function than a legislative function. To hold otherwise, said
the Court, would violate the principle of the separation of institutions."'
In the War Powers context, the same fundamental dilemma is posed.
Professor Corwin characterized this as "an invitation to struggle for the
privilege of directing American foreign policy. 178 How far can the Con-
gress go without infringing upon the President's power and tipping the
delicate constitutional balance in the struggle for control of foreign pol-
icy? The Congress has the power to raise the armed forces, to provide for
their support, to define the qualifications for its members, to approve ap-
pointments and promotions of officers, and to prescribe rules for its con-
duct. It ultimately can control the use of the armed forces through the
appropriations process. Can it also be said of the War Powers that the
Congress may direct the Executive when and how to use the armed forces
directly or through a legislative veto? How does this differ from ordering
the President to give a prescribed set of policy instructions to the Post-
master General? In this sense, Chadha is implicated. In Chadha, the At-
torney General was delegated certain powers, subject to a congressional
veto. The Court found this violated the doctrine of the separation of in-
stitutions. The same reasoning applies to the War Powers Resolution,
which allows Congress to veto the President's policy decision to use
armed force. It is clear that the War Powers Resolution violates the sepa-
ration of powers and institutions upon which our Constitution is based.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION FOR CONDUCTING
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
One writer has noted that "the problem addressed by the War Pow-
ers Resolution is at least as much political as it is constitutional ..
What effect, if any, does the War Powers Resolution have on the con-
duct of American foreign policy? First, it serves as a symbol to foreign
nations that the Executive branch is not free to project military power,
regardless of the political effectiveness such action could have.'80 Thus,
the War Powers Resolution tends to make the United States look like a
"Paper Tiger" in the eyes of many allies and other countries. Second, the
however, rested upon the explicit nature of the Appointments Clause. In Consumer Energy
v. F.E.R.C., 673 F.2d 425, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals struck down a statute
providing for a rejection of an agency plan to deregulate natural gas prices should either
house of Congress excercise a legislative veto. Following the holding of Buckley v. Valeo, the
court observed that "[i]t would be anomalous in the extreme to hold that Congress may not
appoint the officials who make rules, but may enact a mechanism permitting effective con-
gressional control over those officials' decisions." Id. at 474. See also Springer v. Philippine
Islands, 277 U.S. 189.
177. Myers, 272 U.S. at 167.
178. E. CORwIN, supra note 146, at 171.
179. P. HOLT, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN U.S. ARMED
INTERVENTION 1 (1978). See also Wallace, supra note 85, at 721 et seq.
180. Cf. notes and text accompanying notes 154-159, supra.
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War Powers Resolution may actually encourage a group or a State to pro-
long a conflict beyond the 60 and 90 day deadlines. In this sense, the War
Powers Resolution may actually encourage a higher intensity of fighting,
and for a longer period of time, possibly foreclosing to the United States
the opportunity to apply precise and swift force. Alternatively, it may
force the U.S. to make otherwise unnecessary concessions in negotiations
to terminate the American presence. Third, and perhaps a corollary of the
second point, it may encourage a President to use overwhelming force
where a smaller action was called for in order to avoid the 60 day provi-
sion. Fourth, the War Powers Resolution might force the Congress, for
political reasons, to support a presidential action which, upon deliberative
reflection, it might otherwise have opposed. Finally, the War Powers Res-
olution is an invitation to foreign States to wage a political struggle
within the U.S. By virtue of our open society, we find that State sponsors
of terrorism, such as Iran,' 8 ' Libya182 and Syria,1 83 and even international
terrorists like Yassir Arafat and Abu Abbas, have ready access to the
American news media.1 8" In some cases, this access has been employed
skillfully in an attempt to divide the country politically through
disinformation.
These drawbacks are most evident in the United States' effort to
combat international terrorism. Following the U.S. raid on Libya in re-
sponse to that country's continued State-sponsored terrorism,"8 ' there
was wide disagreement on Capitol Hill whether the War Powers Resolu-
tion did or should apply.'88 The time may come when the President of the
United States is compelled to strike a blow at the international terrorist
network.18 7 What he will need is the full support of the country, including
the Congress, lest the action cause more harm (domestically) than good
(internationally). But the War Powers Resolution may be triggered by
events short of the actual use of force 88 such as naval exercises off the
Libyan coast - arguably an area of "imminent hostilities," or by escort-
ing U.S.-flag vessels into the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war. 88
181. See Larschan, Legal Aspects to the Control of Transnational Terrorism: An Over-
view, 13 OHIo N.U.L.REv. 117, 125 (1987).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 126.
184. See generally TERRORISM, THE MEDIA AND THE LAW (A. Miller ed. 1982).
185. Dale, US defends Libya raid, Financial Times (London), Apr. 16, 1986, at 1, col. 3;
Weintraub, American Bombers Strike Bases in Libya; President Asserts Raid Is In Retalia-
tion For "Reign of Terror" Linked to Qaddafi, N.Y. Times, April 15, 1986, at Al, col. 6;
Wilson & Hoffman, U.S. Warplanes Bomb Targets in Libya As 'Self-Defense' Against Ter-
rorism, Wash. Post, Apr. 15, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
186. Dewar & Walsh, War Powers Act Scrutinized, Wash. Post, Apr. 16, 1986, at A30,
col. 1.
187. See, e.g., Ottaway, Schultz Emphasizes Use of Covert Antiterrorism, Vows to
Consult Congress, Wash. Post, May 16, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
188. See, e.g., the examples cited infra at note 212.
189. Roberts, Congress and White House at Odds Over Growing Presence in Gulf, N.Y.
Times, May 21, 1987, at A19, col. 1.
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This also triggered debate on the applicability of the WPR. 190 One won-
ders whether it is unrealistic to require, as a matter of law, that the Presi-
dent consult the whole Congress 1 before American troops are engaged in
hostilities or areas of potential hostilities? A sound U.S. foreign policy
should not permit requiring the President to withdraw troops in 60 or 90
days because the Congress failed to take affirmative steps to approve the
action. Among other things, this is an encouragement to terrorists to hold
out until the War Powers Resolution requires the withdrawal of American
forces. Turner has analogized this to
the experience of French socialist Premier Mendes-France, who an-
nounced in June 1954 that he would resign if he did not succeed in
arranging a cease-fire in Indochina by July 20 of that year. The com-
munist delegations at the Geneva Conference realized that the longer
they stalled the more concessions he would be willing to make to pre-
serve his job. The serious negotiations took place during the final
hours of July 20, and shortly before midnight the wall clock was un-
plugged to permit the French delegation to make a few more conces-
sions within the artificial time deadline.1 9 2
At the very least, the WPR hands the terrorists yet another propaganda
victory by forcing a political debate over the use of force before the action
is concluded.
The natural and understandable response to this is that Congress
should have a voice in the use of American armed forces. However, this
cannot be effected by methods and processes which themselves under-
mine the Constitution. The proper Congressional role is three-part: legis-
lative, budgetary and oversight. The Congress should be an active partner
in Executive decisions relating to the use of U.S. armed forces. As a prac-
On May 17, 1987, an Iraqi warplane fired two missiles, apparently in error, at the U.S.S.
Stark, on patrol in the Persian Gulf. Thirty-seven American seamen were killed and the
Stark was heavily damaged. Wilson & Cannon, Iraqi Missile Sets U.S. Frigate Ablaze,
Causing Casualties, Wash. Post, May 18, 1987, at Al, col. 5. President Reagan felt com-
pelled, for political reasons, to publicly state that the U.S. actions would not lead to war.
Sciolino, Reagan Says U.S. Presence In Gulf Won't Lead to War, N.Y. Times, May 27,
1987, at A14, col. 5.
190. See, e.g., Guns in August, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1987, at A22, col. 1 (editorial);
Adams, Invoke the War Powers Act, Wash. Post, June 29, 1987, at A13, col. 3; Cannon,
President Minimizes War Risk, But Senators Warn Of U.S. Involvement In Iran-Iraq Con-
flict, Wash. Post, May 28, 1987, at Al, col. 6. Compare 133 Cong. Rec. S7,262-63 (daily ed.
May 28, 1987) (statement of Sen. Helms)(arguing against applicability of WPR) with letter
from Sen. Claiborne Pell to Sec'y of State Shultz (May 21, 1987) (arguing in favor of appli-
cability of WPR).
191. If, as the war Powers Resolution claims, the Congress has the exclusive war power,
what is the constitutional validity of consulting with only a handful of Congressional lead-
ers? Is not the Congress, as an institution, to be consulted if there is a constitutional re-
quirement? On a practical level, the most that can and, perhaps, should be expected is that
Presidents will consult with Congressional leaders to obtain a sense of the Congress and to
make a symbolic attempt to work in tandem with the legislature prior to and during the use
of armed force abroad.
192. TURNER, supra note 34, at 687.
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tical matter, no use of armed force will succeed without at least some
support from Cognress.19s One must avoid overstating the virtues of the
Congress at the expense of the Executive by overlooking the effect of the
inevitable swings of public opinion on Congress' position on the use of
force. After the First World War, the isolationists in Congress effectively
eviscerated the Executive's foreign policy powers. It is generally agreed
that our international relations in the inter-war period were, perhaps, the
worst in our history. Partly as a consequence, the Presidency emerged as
not the preeminent, but the exclusive organ of foreign relations upon the
U.S.' entry into the Second World War. Indeed, the popular perception,
inside and outside of Congress at that time, was that the legislative
branch was not to be trusted with foreign policy. It was not until the twin
political crises of Vietnam and Watergate that the pendulum swang the
other way, leading to a resurgence of Congressional power - and the War
Powers Resolution. 194 In noting this phenomenon of American politics,
Walter Lippmann observed that
[t]he unhappy truth is that the prevailing public opinion has been de-
structively wrong at the critical junctures. The people have imposed a
veto upon the judgments of informed and responsible officials. They
have compelled the governments, which usually knew what would
have been wiser, or was necessary, or was more expedient, to be too
late with too little, or too long with too much, too pacifist in peace and
too bellicose in war, too neutralist or appeasing in negotiation or too
intransigent. Mass opinion has acquired mounting power in this cen-
tury. It has shown itself to be a dangerous master of decision when
the stakes are life and death.19 5
In this, Lippmann echoed the astute observations of Alexis de Tocque-
ville, who noted "[t]he propensity which democracies have to obey the
impulse of passion rather than the suggestions of prudence. . .."I" Refer-
ring to England's political leadership during the second half of the 1930s,
Winston Churchill summarized the prevailing credo: "I am their leader,
therefore I must follow them."
One must not generalize from this to say that Congress, because it is
most susceptible to the whims of public opinion, should hold or should
exercise all or none of the War Powers."9 7 In fact, American Presidents
193. Revely observed that "the constitution does impose an iron demand on the Presi-
dent and Congress: that they cooperate if any sustained venture for war or peace is to suc-
ceed." W. REVELY, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: WHO HOLDS THE ARROW
AND OLIVE BRANCH? 49 (1981).
194. Rostow, Once More Unto the Breach: The War Powers Resolution Revisited, 21
VAL. U. L. REv. 1 (1986).
195. W. LIPPMANN, THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHER 23 (1955).
196. 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA Ch. 13, p. 273 (H. Reeve trans.
1974).
197. But see Talbot v. Seemans, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 28, in which Chief Justice Mar-
shall said that "[t]he whole powers of war being, by the constitution of the United States,
vested in congress .... At least one scholar has stated that Marshall had in mind a federal-
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should and frequently do consult with congressional leaders prior to en-
gaging American forces in hostilities. Often, however, secrecy and speed
are the essential ingredients to a successful foreign policy, including the
use of force. 198 Professor Aron observed that "[tihe weapons of mass de-
struction, the techniques of subversion, the ubiquity of military force be-
cause of aviation and electronics, introduce new human and material fac-
tors which render the lessons of the past equivocal at best."19 9 Consider,
for example, President Kennedy's employment of armed forces during the
Cuban Missile Crisis, President Johnson's invasion of the Dominican Re-
public, President Carter's ill-fated Iranian rescue mission and President
Reagan's actions in Grenada. Should the whole Congress have been con-
sulted? What of speed and secrecy?
To recognize contemporary political realities is not to deny that the
Congress possesses legitimate - and vital - powers. Presidents are polit-
ically dependent upon the Congress for continued support, 00 both for the
use of the troops as well as for the entire range of domestic and foreign
policies. A President can ill afford to alienate the Congress, especially on
an issue as sensitive as the use of American troops. In this sense, the War
Powers Resolution is superfluous.
Moreover, the War Powers Resolution is a disservice to the Congress
and the country. It forces the Congress to confront the use of force in an
artificially narrow period, depriving it of the time to gain a perspective on
the armed conflict, to weigh the effectiveness of the action in terms of
U.S. foreign policy objectives and to determine, as far as possible,
whether the use of force will achieve those objectives. In most cases, the
ism issue when he wrote this, i.e., that the federal government, and not the states, had the
"whole powers of war." B. ZIEGLER, supra note 73. This was the first case decided by the
Supreme Court after Marshall's appointment. 3 A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL
16 (1919).
198. Certainly this was recognized with respect to the negotiation of treaties. See The
Federalist No. 64 (J. Jay), supra note 42, at 327; The Federalist No. 75 (A. Hamilton),
supra note 42, at 379.
199. R. ARON, supra note 155, at 2.
200. One respected scholar observed that there are constitutional limitations on Con-
gress' power to control executive conduct of armed conflict through the appropriations pro-
cess. See Wallace, supra note 85, at 748-52. This also seems to be the position taken by
Monroe Leigh when he was State Department Adviser, when he testified that:
I do believe personally that such matters [as the Cambodia and Vietnam evac-
uations] involve the inherent constitutional power of the President and I don't
think that every limitation that Congress might enact on an appropriation or
otherwise is necessarily a constitutional one. I think there are some that would
be plainly unconstitutional.
Hearings on Compliance with the War Powers Resolution Before the Subcomm. on Inter-
national Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Comm. on International Relations,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (testimony of Monroe Leigh) (1975).
It has been stated, however, that the Supreme Court has never held unconstitutional
any use of the appropriations power as a counter-weight to Presidential action. See THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc.
No. 82, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1597-1619 (1973).
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use of force is popular in at least the first two or three months; because of
this, Congress may give its blessing to an armed conflict by riding the
crest of nationalistic fervor. The strength of the Congress lies in its thor-
ough - and time-consuming - "step-by-step, deliberate and deliberative
process,"201 evaluating all the facts, discussing all the issues, before com-
mitting itself.
The War Powers Resolution was designed to deal with one President
and one armed conflict. 0" The Congressional override of the presidential
veto came less than three weeks after the "Saturday night massacre,"
when Attorney General Elliot Richardson and Deputy Attorney General
William Ruckelshaus resigned rather than dismiss Watergate special
prosecutor Archibald Cox. s0 3 But would the War Powers Resolution have
prevented the Vietnam episode? The answer is probably not.24 The Gulf
of Tonkin Resolution20 almost certainly gave the President the legal sup-
201. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959. "What emerges from our analysis of the purpose of the
law making restrictions in Article I is that the Framers were determined that the legislative
power should be difficult to employ." Consumer Energy Council of America v. F.E.R.C., 673
F. 2d at 464. Cf. the statement by former Senator Javits that
[iun most situations, even when a clear consensus is presented, it takes a long
time for Congress to make its legislative will, owing, in large measure, to the
various forms a single, affirmative, legislative remedy may take. A simple and
unamenable resolution of approval or disapproval adopted pursuant to a legis-
lative veto provision incorporated into an earlier statute, however, avoids the
institutional delays and permits expedited postenactment review.
Javits & Klein, Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analy-
sis, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 455, 462 (1977).
202. Eugene Rostow observed just prior to the enactment of the War Powers Resolu-
tion that [w]e wisely refrained from curbing the powers of the Supreme Court even after the
catastrophic error of Dred Scott. The same calm prudence should guide our course now,
with respect to the Presidency. Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act,
supra note 61, at 836.
203. It is at best problematic that the veto of the War Powers Resolution would have
been overridden absent the unique domestic political conditions in the country at the time,
and especially the "Saturday night massacre." See R. TURNER, THE WAR POWERS RESOLU-
TION: ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 109 (1983); TURNER, supra note 34, at
685.
204. See supra the cases cited in note 120.
205. H.R.J. Res. 1145, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384,
reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 441-42. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
provides that
The Congress approves and supports the determination of the President,
as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed
attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further
aggresssion.
Sec. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to
world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast
Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of
the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast
Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as
the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of
armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Col-
lective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.
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port required by Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution to bypass the
entire issue of the 60 or 90 day deadlines.2 0 6 In fact, as previously noted,
the Congress enabled the President to continue American involvement in
Vietnam through the draft and massive appropriations. 0 7
The War Powers Resolution would have had a devastating impact,
however, on the United States' entry into the Second World War. The
American Congress was unalterably opposed to entering the war against
Germany between 1939 and 1941, even as Hitler tightened his grip on
Europe and the Battle of Britain raged. 0 8 It is often overlooked that in
August 1941, the House of Representatives renewed mandatory conscrip-
tion by a single vote.209 This led President Franklin Roosevelt, who fa-
vored an early U.S. entry into the war, to confide at the close of the
Argentia summit conference that he intended to wage war, not to declare
it.110 The same can be said of the United States' entry into the First
World War and repelling the invasion of South Korea. Would Presidents
Wilson or Truman have risked precipitating a constitutional crisis by
challenging the War Powers Resolution? 21 1 Perhaps they would have felt
compelled to do so; but would a constitutional crisis have been in the
Sec. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine
that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international
conditions created by the actions of the United Nations or otherwise, except
that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.
On the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, see generally J. GALLOWAY, THE GULF OF TONKIN RESOLU-
TION (1970). See also The Gulf of Tonkin, The 1964 Incident: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). The Gulf Of Tonkin Resolution
was repealed in January 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-672; 84 Stat. 2053, 2055, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1971).
206. Compare, for example, the remarks of Sen. Fubright, 110 CONG. REc. 18,409
(1964), with Sen. Morse, 110 CONG. REC. 18,430 (1964).
207. See, e.g., Supplemental Appropriation, Pub. L. No. 89-18, 79 Stat. 109; Defense
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-171 § 638, 83 Stat. 469, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 507.
208. When President Roosevelt warned the Congress in 1939 that the world was teeter-
ing on the brink of war, Senator William E. Borah stated that there would be no war with
Germany. "I have my own sources of information," he said, insisting on continuing the pol-
icy of isolationism. W. LANGER & S. GLEASON, THE CHALLENGE TO ISOLATION, 1937-1940 144
(1952).
209. G. PRANGE, supra note 132, at 178. "No wonder that Nomura [Japan's Ambassador
to the United States] could never quite convince the Foreign Ministry that the Americans
'meant business'; talk and bluster were cheap, but when it came to a hard vote to lay before
their constituents, Congress felt safe in nearly scuttling the draft." Id.
210. See, e.g., J. COLVILLE, THE FRINGES OF POWER: 10 DOWNING STREET DIARIES 1939-
1955 428 (1985); P. ABBAZIA, MR. ROOSEVELT'S NAVY: THE PRIVATE WAR OF THE U.S. ATLAN-
TIC FLEET, 1939-1942 220 (1975); 6 M. GILBERT, WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: FINEST HOUR, 1939-
1941 1168 (1983). In fact, this is precisely what Roosevelt did prior to formal hostilities,
with the Destroyers for Bases deal, see supra note 67, and with the so-called War in the
Atlantic, in which Roosevelt declared that any German or Italian warship in the western
half of the Atlantic would be attacked by the U.S. Navy. See, e.g., note 139.
211. Senator Robert C. Byrd stated that "the Chadha decision has driven us to attempt
to correct what would probably be a constitutional crisis at exactly a time the Nation could
not afford it." 129 CONG. REC. S14,164 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1983).
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country's best interest at so delicate a period? President Nixon argued
that the War Powers Resolution "would have vastly complicated or even
made impossible" the U.S. actions in the 1961 Berlin Crisis, the Cuban
Missile Crisis, the Congo rescue operation in 1964 and the 1970 Jordanian
Crisis." 2 He went on to observe that the War Powers Resolution would
undercut the ability of the United States to act as an effective influ-
ence for peace. For example, the provisions automatically cutting off
certain authorities after 60 days unless they are extended by the Con-
gress could work to prolong or intensify a crisis. Until the Congress
suspended the deadline, there would be at least a chance of United
States withdrawal and an adversary would be tempted therefore to
postpone serious negotiations until the 60 days were up. Only after
the Congress acted would there be a strong incentive for an adversary
to negotiate. In addition, the very existence of a deadline could lead to
an escalation of hostilities in order to achieve certain objectives before
the 60 days expire.2 51
As tragic as the American experience was in Vietnam, this cannot
erase the lessons learned throughout our history, that the President is far
better equipped than the Congress to determine when armed force should
be used. The effect of the War Powers Resolution is to undermine the
ability of the President to project military power. This is especially im-
portant when the United States is confronted with acts of international
terrorism, where speedy and decisive action may be required.
V. CONCLUSION
Sections 5(b) and (c) of the War Powers Resolution are unconstitu-
tional because they act as a legislative veto, contrary to the Supreme
Court's holding in Chadha, and because they impinge upon the Execu-
tive's war and foreign affairs powers. Section 5(c) is unconstitutional be-
cause it purports to grant to Congress the power to require the President
to withdraw U.S. armed forces pursuant to a concurrent resolution. Thus,
an action undertaken by the President can be vetoed by a simple majority
congressional vote. Section 5(b) is unconstitutional on two grounds; first,
it seeks to limit Presidential authority to use armed forces to a 60 or 90
day time period, unless specifically extended by the Congress, giving rise
to a legislative veto of Executive action. Moreover, Section 5(b) impinges
upon the President's constitutional authority to use armed force pursuant
to his Executive and foreign policy powers, violating the doctrine of the
212. "Veto of the War Powers Resolution," supra note 2. Professor Rostow found that
the War Powers Resolution would have made "illegal": "the expedition of Commodore
Perry to Japan"; "mobilization of troops to the Mexican border after the Civil War to per-
suade France to abandon support of Maximillian"; "President Nixon's policies towards
China... because the heart of those policies is a diplomatic warning to the Soviet Union
not to make war on China"; and, U.S. actions in the 1973 Middle East war. Rostow, Com-
ment, 61 VA. L. REV. 797, 803-04 (1975).
213. "Veto of War Powers Resolution," supra note 2.
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separation of powers and institutions.
As a matter of policy, the War Powers Resolution has undermined
the United States' ability to project military power as a means of con-
ducting foreign policy by creating uncertainty as to the U.S. commitment
and by ensuring an untimely insertion of Congress in the decision-making
process. The Congress has a major and ultimately decisive role to play
with respect to the use of U.S. armed forces. However, congressional pow-
ers are limited by the Constitution. The use of the armed forces is an
Executive function; providing for their support is a Legislative function.
The President should, and often does, consult with congressional leaders
prior to sending U.S. armed forces into combat. This is a matter of com-
ity and politics but not a constitutional requirement.
Finally, the War Powers Resolution is ineffective. It would not have
prevented the Vietnam war. However, it may hamper the effective use of
force against international terrorism by creating an artificial controversy
and by precipitating a constitutional crisis at a time when a united politi-
cal front is needed.
